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1. Introduction 
A welfare state presupposes the existence of both a market economy and a democratic  
political system. The hallmark of it is that the government intervenes in the distribution of 
goods and services to ensure a more equitable allocation than the free market can readily 
provide. The more welfare in the form of more and wider transfer payments, is it better? It 
depends, at least, who we look at and how the benefits are provided. The term welfare is used 
deliberately in this context since emphases are put on the government role. It is used, closely 
in the debates, which devote attention to what the State "ought to" or "should" not deliver. 
The high social security level lies in a problem area, because it might encourage certain  
behavior to low savings when economic security is guaranteed, to high wage demands  
because the state ensures the event of unemployment, to low social and geographical mobil-
ity, because the benefits are high, for black labor market as taxes are high, "moonlighting," – 
people working multiple jobs, and finally to work "too little" because it simply does not pay 
to "run longer and faster." The result is that human capital does not develop quickly and well 
enough. Our primary goal is to highlight the negative effects, called welfare hazard, i.e., an 
inverse working incentive of transfer payments, and long-term consequences of this using a 
theoretical model of flimsy or fictitious governmental institutions. Welfare hazard in this 
framework is closely related to delivery of benefits and subsidies. 
Imagine a scenario of real life masquerade or realistic utopia when two flimsy or fictitious 
governmental institutions play a bargaining game. Public agencies want to maximize welfare 
pie as much as possible – more to share in the long term. They tend to focus on regulations of 
private business, limit government's scope of using its powers, to combat criminal violence 
and commercial fraud. Social agencies tend to see the source of evil in disproportion of  
consumption, unjust redistribution of wealth and income, the profit motive and private prop-
erty. Therefore, social agencies prefer an additional equitable sharing of the available stock 
of goods and services here and now, which market forces are not suitable to provide, and 
which necessitates government intervention. Consider the choice of poverty line through  
social institutions that are aware of citizens tax sacrifices to finance services and subsidies to 
the needy. Whatever it is, the greater the sacrifice, the less private budget for consumption of 
all citizens, and so larger the quantity of public goods to be delivered. Social services and 
public goods are always the basic expectations that contribute to political debates about tax 
policies towards consumers who may see the effects of tax sacrifices on private consumption 
opportunities as voters represented by the social and public agencies. 
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Our brief remark hopefully clarified some goals of the State by which we might conclude 
that welfare policy in a representative democracy always faces conflicting interests of institu-
tions. This paper tries to shed light on how a consensus is reached among government 
institutions and whether the consensus reflects tax policy criteria to be the greatest benefit for 
all members of society. To address this issue, we use two flimsy or fictitious actors, named 
negotiators. Our strategy masquerades negotiators with a political mandate to initiate propos-
als that either support or oppose expectations of citizens for more or better welfare services. 
A balance of transfer payments for benefits and services claimed by citizens lays the  
constraint on delivery of public goods bringing under control the scene of negotiations. The 
negotiators acting on the scene within limits of the constraint in the roles of social and public 
agencies try to get funding for the proposals, which is the classic problem of public finance 
allocation set up by the alternating-offers bargaining game on how to share the tax revenue, 
also called the welfare pie. The third actor behind the scene, the representative voter, is left 
with no options other than of voting for or against higher taxes. 
We believe that the size of the welfare pie increases progressively depending on the poverty 
line increase. Despite the size increase, poverty line in our scheme will shape the expecta-
tions of negotiators in a different way: single ∩-peaked for social agencies, Fig. 1; all but not 
subsidies represent expectations of public agencies in accord with the size of the pie, Fig. 2. 
Notice, elevated single ∩-peaked curve S on Fig. 1 corresponds, to the lower but progres-
sively increasing, concave curve S of expectations on Fig. 2, and other work around for P to 
P; x-axis indicate poverty line, y-axis expectations. In support to our belief, the expectations, 
shaped this way, emerge from income distributions inside two-man economy endowed by 
agents’ income abilities marginalized on income level, i.e., agents with low incomes below 
the poverty line receive subsidies, agents with higher incomes, above the line, do not. 
 
Figure 1, social agencies expectations 
 
Figure 2, public agencies expectations 
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In respect to these so-called non-conforming expectations, when an offer is made (irrelevant 
who makes the offer), social agencies tend to control the poverty line parameter ξ  independ-
ently. Varying the parameter, social agencies are supposed to reach the peak of their expec-
tations. In making those suppositions, we hope together with Rawls [1971: 304] precepts of 
justice that "The sum of transfers and benefits…" (the subsidies )(B ξ , see below)… "from 
essential public goods should be arranged so as to enhance the expectations of the least  
favored consistent with the required saving and the maintenance of equal liberties." 
Single peakedness plays a major role in collective decision-making, when the decision is  
arrived by a vote, originated from Black, (1948: 27). The expectation of social minimum to 
be single peaked is the result of an assumption that tax sacrifice taken upon income equal to 
the poverty line parameter is a progressively increasing function of the parameter itself  
provided negotiators commit to the slice of the pie in eventual agreement, observation 2. 
Arranged traditionally, the bargaining problem consists of sharing some monetary resources 
in rational or just way. Literally speaking, the slicing of the pie is the main problem, what  
the players try to solve during the negotiations. Given that the expectations of players are 
non-conforming, i.e., single peaked for the first in contrast to the other, the traditional proce-
dure of how to slice the pie may be put differently, which suites better, as we see it, to meet 
some circumstances of "real life controversies," – not any more as a division of a resource. 
The main idea of our message is the most important point that slices bargain procedure can 
be rescheduled, then, into poverty lines parametric space in a way that negotiations upon 
slices occur instead within some interval of the parameter, which turns to be the scope of  
negotiations. The other way around is true as well; in fact, Cardona and Ponsattí (2007: 628) 
also noticed that "the bargaining problem is not radically different from negotiations to split 
a private surplus," when all in the bargain have conforming ∩-expectations. The situation 
holds true even the expectations of the second player are principally non-conforming, not 
single peaked but concave. What should be pointed out here concerns individual rationality, 
Roth (1977), known as a set of negotiations or bargaining set or "well defined bargaining 
problem," which allows dropping the axiom of "Pareto Efficiency." Well-defined bargaining 
set is rescheduled then to one-dimensional space, and the status quo or breakdown might be 
viewed as inefficient policy with notably low poverty line, outside the scope of negotiations. 
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To negotiate on slices or poverty lines, both procedures, we can say, are two sides of the 
same bargain portfolio. Therefore, are the players bargaining on slices of pie or trying to 
agree on poverty lines makes no difference. The main advantage of parametric procedure 
comes trough: it brings about a number of different patterns of interpretations of outcomes in 
the game, binding, for example, poverty lines to the average amount of taxable income, 
called the wealth, tax returns or, to the lowest tax rate, … etc., all as indictors of the most  
desirable sacrifice by taxpayers. Moreover, in consideration of alternatives ways to set the 
poverty line, which includes possibilities to describe the outcomes of collective bargaining in 
form of voting, or voting in form of bargaining, in any voting scheme the scope of negotia-
tions brings the voting and bargaining under one roof. In this way we hope to enrich the 
range of interpretations for both – the bargaining and voting schemes. 
Our welfare game comprises as an indicator the bargaining power of social agencies. To 
deal properly with the indicator, the breakdown point, however, cannot be given exoge-
nously. To overcome the obstacle, one can supply the game with a point of breakdown 
extracted endogenously on condition, called equity of breakdown. 
Beyond the perception of how to negotiate an expected slice of the welfare pie, it is also 
reasonable to believe that income distribution is, perhaps, the only target for control and an 
exclusive source to assess welfare policy. The welfare game is neither justified based on  
empirical income distribution nor does it provide the data and empirical support from the 
field. Even as this key weakness is understood, the poverty line, drawn under the rules of the 
game across typical income distribution, is close enough to be considered a realistic match 
(Table 1) with Fuchs point (50% of median income) by which terms Rawls (1971: 98) came 
out with an alternative to the second principle of justice with no reference to social position. 
No part of the literature has dealt with parametric bargaining while slicing the welfare  
pie among institutions of "welfare state" and directly linking it to (a) welfare policy,  
(b) alternating-offers game, and (c) wealth redistribution. We are looking forward by the  
scheme to enroll such a tripod-linkage in the calculus of bargaining game solutions since it 
may be useful for institutional economics. Richter (2005: 387), in a review on "Handbook of 
New Institutional Economics," indeed, pointed out "that the sociological analysis…and large 
institutional structures in economic life is still at an early stage…game theory, and computer 
simulation could help to further develop the new institutional approach…game theory might 
be a defendable heuristic device of NIE." 
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To discern the root cause of the results and to find solutions for the welfare game, we try to 
move in all three directions of the linkage scheme that aims to bring on the surface the  
economic content in a rigorous mathematical form and to lay the way for the presentation of 
results along the following modules: 
Stabilization Once balanced, the portion of the welfare pie for funding subsidies,  throughout and in spite of volatility in the economy, must remain balanced; 
Bargaining The negotiations between social and public agencies of how to slice of the welfare pie  comply with the rules and regulations in the alternating-offers bargaining game; 
Unanimous 
consent 
Bringing a motion to a vote is necessary to meet consumer perception against high  
taxes and excessive public spending. Whether it is good or bad or whether it ought to be  
acknowledged or not, or rejected or accepted, this motion must be carried out by the  
unanimous consent of voter-citizens. 
The tripod-linkage scheme is nothing but requirements to be met by rules and regulations of 
the welfare game, which we are going to discuss later, c.f. “Rational man” deliberation,  
Rubinstein (1998: 7). We hope to show that the scheme will enable us to state the view under 
which conduct these modules like a cascade are embedded into welfare policy of the state. To 
perform poverty and income distribution analysis this cascade is accessible for observation 
and could be subject to computer simulations in evaluating wealth redistribution policies,  
appendix C. Our initiative by itself could also be of certain value for unifying the theoretical 
structure of economic analysis of institutions, for passing judgment on social and public  
organizations, or for systematic inquiry into impacts of governmental decisions and actions. 
In the next section, we discuss the relevant trends and issues of welfare policy encircled by 
the three modules mentioned above. In Section 3, we invite the reader to play a sugar pie 
game in a way that illustrates the standard of how to adjust the bargaining power of negotia-
tors to make sure the agreement if a specific outcome of negotiations is desirable. We also 
hope that, before advancing any further, the reader will try to solve our sweet exercise at the 
end of the section. In Section 4, we discuss the assumptions to be made a priori on the func-
tions and primitives involved and then we go along the cascade of tripod-linkage scheme. In 
the first module, we disclose a volatility constraint, under which restraint a balanced portion 
of the welfare pie for funding subsidies in amalgamation with stability constraint holds down 
inverse working incentives effect, which is called welfare hazard. In the second module, we 
make an effort to embrace the ambivalence and multifaceted welfare perception of citizens 
from the angle of the alternating-offers game. Our work associates the policy on poverty with 
bargaining related to monetary expectations of two actors – the social and public agencies. In 
principal, given arbitrary income distribution, it would be possible, within the scope of nego-
tiations, to obtain an exact analytical solution of the game (find the proof in the appendix B). 
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The actors on the opposite sides of the bargaining table might haggle over the terms of  
outcomes and delay the decision on consolidating a draft to the agreement. The draft might 
not necessarily be the best outcome, and citizens may vote against the draft, emanating a  
risk to break down the negotiations. Thus, in lines with our bargaining procedure, only in  
the third module do we reveal an appropriately settled bargaining problem for the game  
that would probably enable voter-citizens to accept a proposal by unanimous consent. In  
Section 5, we discuss an equity condition and the possibilities of setting up a breakdown 
point of the game endogenously. Section 6 summarizes and ends the study with a postscript 
of rules and regulations, associated with the welfare game. 
2. Relevant trends and issues 
"The interface between economics and politics is still in a primitive state in our theories but 
its development is essential if we are to implement policies consistent with intentions," as 
pointed out by North (2005: 29). Feldstein (2008: 132) also noticed: "Unfortunately, there is 
no reason to be pleased about the analysis in policy discussions of the efficiency effects…of 
the welfare consequences of proposed tax changes." In what follows, we examine the  
publications on economic behavior, which deal with the sociological effects of welfare  
using public finance, which is the best starting point to go into our tripod-linkage scheme of 
the welfare game. 
Public finance focuses on the revenue side of tax policy. It deals, in particular, with  
tax-induced efficiency effects (c.f. Formby and Medema [1995]) and implications on equity 
principles of welfare, whereas for agents with low-income levels, the welfare policy is a  
different matter. It is worth considering on the grounds of legal and moral rights of citizens. 
Empirical evidence consistent with legal obligations can be found in the literature of welfare 
policy: "...Henderson poverty line. The line was initially set (in 1966) equal to the level of the 
minimum wage plus family benefits for one-earner couple with two children," Saunders 
(1997: 29). Hypothesis consistent with moral obligations can be found in the literature of 
economic politics (c.f. Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee [1996], Feld and Frey [2002]). 
Musgrave (1959) examined two main approaches to taxation: the "benefit approach" and 
"ability-to-pay approach," which put taxation accordingly into efficiency and equity context. 
We intend to augment the existing principles of welfare policy by the benefit approach, as we 
see it, allocating a guaranteed minimum or level of basic goods for the lowest taxes. More-
over, to keep taxes fairly levied, we think the best tax for all citizens injects optimal equity 
into the tax system according to the ability-to-pay principle of "proportional sacrifice." 
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Stabilization. The purchase, production, and delivery of social services and public goods 
give rise to public spending. Often referred to in common parlance as welfare expenses, a 
portion of expenditure is meant to reimburse agents, those who had a misfortune, through 
subsidies. To be specific, subsidies are benefits for agents with low incomes and limited  
assets, providing an adequate chance to improve their disposable income. Agents who are 
eligible for benefits do not have many assets; they are not flexible in the labor market; and 
their income lies below the poverty line, driving them into social exclusion. Therefore, bene-
ficiaries who decide to claim benefits would be better off under social administration. At 
other extreme, because of implemented declines in welfare and services, the administration 
revokes the benefits by submitting a request to some permanent clients who might find them-
selves worse off and to decide to be flexible once again in the labor market. That is to say, 
the emphasis on welfare implementation may manifest itself in hidden ambiguity as a result 
of economic growth, decline or stagnation, demographic shift, pit or migration, political 
change and change in scarcity of resources, property rights, level skills and education of  
labor force, etc., by disturbing the rules and regulations of social services. Now, while the 
services either improve or decay, the agents whose disposable income is in proximity of the 
poverty line may cause a feedback, a hazard ( h -factor) effect on subsidies and benefits, 
which may have an impact on the tax compliance of all citizens. 
A principal source to pay for subsidies and benefits is taxation. The social agencies have to 
solve the problem of stability of public spending in cooperation with other fiscal institutions, 
as it cannot be solved by market mechanism alone. Thus, the first module in welfare policy 
cascade discloses the stability paradigm in welfare policy. 
According to the ability-to-pay principle in public finance to make the distortion of tax 
policies stable, the known terms of warranty rely on exogenous taxes enforced on the  
productivity of agents. A variant of the classic public finance and the like (Berliant and Page 
Jr. [1996]) this concept applies when an agent with given productivity does not shift his/her 
labor supply after all adjustments to the tax formula have been implemented; optimal  
taxation enforces optimal labor supply. 
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Yet, another "treatment of policies," closely related to institutional stability, entails equity of 
pre- and post-tax positions of taxpayers. Such a view to demarcate between agents attracts 
the attention of economists and tax policymakers. Credit-tax-scheme analysis opposes the 
income-tested program in the rich-and-the-poor, two-man economy (Kesselman and 
Garfinkel (1978). Fuchs (1965) was among the few who first observed properties of the  
relative poverty margin at one-half of median family income as arbitrary but reasonable. Sen 
(1976), Atkinson (1987), and Hunter et al. (2002) succeed on poverty measurements.  
Horizontal inequalities seem to occupy a place in Stewart’s (2000) paper, which reviews the 
connection linking income distribution and economic growth. Ebert (2008) developed a prin-
ciple of concentration for the redistribution of income. Peñalosa and Wen (2004) investigate 
redistribution, which operates as a form of social insurance. 
We continue to rely on postulation that, throughout and in spite of volatility in the econ-
omy, welfare policy remains stable. By postulating this, we end up in stabilization for public 
spending in an attempt to control the circulation of wealth through social and public agencies 
and explain how can the wealth redistribution reach all in society. 
Bargaining. Entering the bargaining module of the cascade while pushing along the policy, 
which is stable to move ahead, it is realistic to imagine a scene where our actors play  
the alternating-offers "bargaining drama" in the roles of social and public agencies.  
"These flimsy structures, however, are used by individuals to allocate resource flows  
to participants according to rules that have been devised in tough constitutional and  
collective-choice bargaining situations over time," Ostrom (2005: 823) stated. Bargaining, 
after all, can be risky, because if the terms of voter-citizens are not met, the voter may vote 
behind the scene against the draft to the agreement. Therefore, by Osborn and Rubinstein’s 
(1990: 71) variant of the bargaining game with exogenous risk of breakdown, we reveal an 
analytical solution setting up the outcome of the game as poverty line instead of traditional 
solutions like slices dividing the welfare pie. Despite social and public agencies are pursuing 
their own causes, we demonstrate that social and public agencies might end up being able to 
agree upon compatible portions of the welfare pie for funding the primary or basic goods 
(needs), and all non-primary, called public goods. Bargaining has been a theme of a wide 
range of publications (Roth [1985]). 
    
 
 
9 
 
 
Unanimous consent. The interaction of taxpayers in terms of the scheme to reject by a  
single representative vote the draft to the agreement between social and public agencies is in 
reality an ultimate threat to achieve the goal of taxpayers (citizens) – the less tax, the better. 
The private well-being of citizens is the reason why the message is taken into consideration 
at the third module. At this module, it is rational to go and to maintain the momentum of  
citizens by focusing on moderate portions of the welfare pie for the provision and delivery of 
primary or basic (the subsidies and benefits) and non-primary (the public goods) in order to 
improve the perception and behavior of consumers against high taxes. Otherwise, disoriented 
consumers or disagreeing social and public agencies at previous modules could further block 
the attempts in making favorable policies for citizens. 
Buchanan (1967: 71) underlined "…that of earmarking, the individual ‘votes for’ desig-
nated taxes to finance specific public outlay. In the other, general-fund financing, he ‘votes 
for’ the same taxes to finance, not a single service, but a budgetary bundle of several  
services." In contrast, we put an extra emphasis on the design and analysis of a debating and 
voting platform for the welfare policy on poverty (Table 1). However, we neither design nor 
analyze any voting system or scheme by which voter-citizens express their expectation as  
taxpayers. As noticed by Roberts (1977: 329), "The point is not whether choices in the public 
domain are made through a voting mechanism but whether choice procedures mirror some 
voting mechanism," and thus, we adhere to all voting guidelines where each tax proposal 
comes with or includes its own tax (c.f. Mueller [2003: 67]). We see no reason to depart from 
this and wish to stress that welfare policy would not be approved by the unanimous consent 
as long as the goal of minimizing taxes (observation 6) is desirable. 
3. The sugar pie game 
We are correct, as it seems to us, in believing that those who stay behind baking a welfare 
pie for public consumption do not realize that citizens’ demands of welfare and public goods 
to a greater extent might sometimes worsen the quality of cooking the pie in the welfare  
policy oven. This is how we perceive it and hope that the process of finding the solution  
in a sugar pie game is the best way to understand what happens. We invite the reader to  
play the game, which explains the situation with welfare pie in simple terms.  
The game may be connected to how a piece of sugar pie is fairly sliced between two people: 
HE, a soft negotiator, not very keen on sweets but with emphasis on quality; and SHE, a 
tough negotiator, likes sweets, whatever they are. The question about the size of the pie we 
leave temporarily aside for the present. 
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The axiomatic bargaining theory finds the asymmetric Nash solution by maximizing the 
product of players’ expectations above the disagreement point 21 d,dd = : 
 ( ) ( ) ααα −≤+≤ −⋅−= 121   1 y  x 0   d)y(gd)x(u),y,x(fmax arg , 
the asymmetric variant (Kalai [1977]). 
Although the answer may be known to game theory purists, the questions often asked by 
many include the following: "What are x , y , α , )x(u  and )y(g ? What does the point 
21 d,d  mean? How is the maxarg  formula used?" The answer looks like this: 
x  is HIS slicing the pie, and α  is HIS bargaining power, 10 ≤≤ x , 10 ≤≤α ; 
)x(u  is HIS expectation, for example x)x(u ≡ , of HIS x  slicing the pie; 
y  is HER slicing the pie, and α−1  is HER bargaining power, 10 ≤≤ y ; 
)y(g  is HER expectation, for example y)y(g ≡ , of HER y  slicing the pie. 
In widely accepted vocabulary, we call )y(g),x(us =  the utility pair. The disagreement 
point 21 d,dd =  is what HE and SHE collect if they disagree how to slice the pie. The 
sugar pie disagreement point is 0021  ,d,dd == ; disagreeing players collect nothing. 
Further, we believe that expectations from the pie are more valuable for HER indicating HER 
desire 70702121 .)(g == , which is greater than HIS desire 5021 .)(u = . 
Now considering the maxarg  formula of ),y,x(f α  one may ask a new question: "What 
standard will HE, the sugar pie negotiator, base HIS decision on to obtain an equal half of 
the pie?" That is to ask, what standard will facilitate HIS negotiating power α  to obtain the 
half of the pie if SHE may only accept or reject the proposal. A technical person can shed 
light on the solution. First, replace )x(u  with x , put xy −= 1 , replace )y(g  with x−1 , 
and take the derivative of the result ),x,x(f α−1  with respect to the variable x  by evaluat-
ing ),x,x(f x α−′ 1 . Later, replace 21=x , and finally solve the equation 02121 =′ ),,(fx α  
for α ; the equation 02121 =′ ),,(fx α  resolves for 31=α . 
In general, one might feel comfort in the following judgment. "Even in the face of the fact 
that SHE is twice as tough a negotiator, 1 to count on the half of the pie is a realistic attitude 
towards HIS position of negotiations. Surely, rather sooner than later, since HE revealed 
that SHE likes sweets, HE would have HER to agree to a concession." This attitude might 
well be the standard if a half of the pie is desirable as a specific outcome of negotiations. 
                                                          
1  Let us say, she pays her solicitor twice as much as he does. 
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Exercise. In our sugar pie slicing game, rational players have a reason to align operating 
procedure of any eventual agreement. The negotiators suppose to play the bargaining drama 
of alternative offers resulting in some commitments of how to slice the pie. When agreement 
on slice of pie is reached a new real life problem arise: Who should order the pie in the  
bakery, to select the size, and to ensure a safe delivery of the pie to its end destination.  
Usually players negotiate on issues when there are equal preconditions in place that guaran-
tee equal rights in bargaining. We go in opposite direction, pointing out our believes in a 
normative manner, correct or not, what so ever they are, because our approach expects to 
deal with skills shortage of the second player. The decision-making on size of the pie is an 
exclusive privilege of the first player. However, the second player will preserve its advisory 
rights regarding the size of the pie. 
Indeed, assume that only HE has all relevant skills of cooking, whereas SHE does not; HE 
possesses some hidden knowledge, which can be used in situations where HE can enforce the 
bakery to cook properly, or effectively retaliate for breaches if the quality of cooking does 
not meet its goal whereas SHE cannot. Moral-Principal problem may also arise, because we 
believe in addition that HE acts on HER behalf. Having fewer skills about cooking SHE  
cannot completely monitor HIS actions or intentions; HE may have an incentive to act  
inappropriately (from HER viewpoint) if the interests of both are not aligned in eventual 
agreement. We believe that SHE lacks such abilities and knowledge and might show  
willingness to agree or, at least, not to resist HIS privileges to make an order and to decide 
upon the size of the pie. On the other hand, the bakery has limits of its own within realistic 
utopia, e.g., the size of the pie might be too large to fit into the oven, or deficit of finance 
may occur forcing the bakery to close its activities, etc., i.e., a risk of bankruptcy (fiscal  
inconsistency) event is pending. Bakery utopian limitations (in real life the tax system  
inconsistency or volatility of economic resources) are a common knowledge, as we believe 
they are; both players know all these circumstances, which must be taken into account. 
Therefore the risk of breakdown may be the driving force for both players to reach the 
agreement in order to bake the pie reasonably. 
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Suppose now that in the background of HIS judgment the quality of the pie first increases 
when the size is small, but reaching the peak point it starts to decline: the quality, one will 
say, is ∩-single peaked upon the size. For HER the pie is desirable whatever it is. Let us  
try to play the sugar pie game in a different way when HE alone placing an order for the  
delivery to the bakery prescribes the size z  of the pie. In the example SHE just recommends 
the size z  that HE is not committed to accept, but HE is committed to the slice x  aligned by 
the agreement. Let the utility pair g,u  of HIS and HER expectations is given by: 
( )[ ] zz z −+⋅= 21 x)x,(u , y)y,(g ⋅= zz , [ ]10,∈z , [ ]10,y,x ∈ . 
Define binding slices to the size z  as a curve )(x z , which resolve 0=′ )x,( zuz  for x . 
Evaluating x  from 0=′ )x,( zuz  and then replacing )(x z  into )x,(u z  and )x,(g z  we  
get 2zz =)(u  and zzz ⋅−⋅= 43)(g . Hereby, the bargaining problem d,S  transfers 
into parametric space )(g),(u zzb =S  of the size parameter [ ] [ ]104321 ,, ⊂∈z . I call  
the interval [ ]4321 ,  by the scope of negotiations: 21  and 43  resolve 0021 =′ ),(zu   
and 0143 =′ ),(zu  for z  accordingly. In HIS view the pie must fit to size, since outside the 
interval [ ]4321 ,  it is too small or has a low quality of baking but useful. Therefore, the  
disagreement occurs at 0414321 ,)(g),(ud == . When we impose a constraint that the 
size of the welfare pie remains fixed (stable) during the delivery to its end destinations, the 
Nash symmetric solution to the game is found at 690.=z , 740.x = . However, HIS asym-
metric power 2120.  is sufficient to negotiate with HER about the half of the pie provided the 
size 620.=z  is suitable for cooking in the oven.  
4. The welfare pie game 
Welfare theory is based on that the optimal redistribution of goods in a society is achieved 
through optimal allocation of society's resources. Fundamentally, this is about redistribution 
of wealth. If we identify a basis for welfare policy, we must find the point for optimal  
provision and delivery of basic and primary goods. Because of moral and political grounds 
basic goods are unrelated in principle to the other goods, e.g., national defense, public safety, 
environment protection, education and health services, roads and highway systems, etc.  
Conventionally, national defense, … etc., on the list, are all the primary goods. Naming these 
goods in the list, in contrast to basic goods, as "non-primary" but public goods, suites better 
to our purposes. However, when basic and public goods are on delivery to its end destina-
tions we preserve the traditional notification for both goods as public goods. 
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Preliminaries. We believe that splitting up the public goods into basic and other wants is  
acceptable, and, then, it is, more or less, reasonable to follow the same pattern like "playing 
the sugar pie game." Indeed, the situation looks more like a bargaining game between social 
agencies negotiating favorable portion, i.e., the slice x , 10 ≤≤ x , of the pie with public 
agencies. Following the traditional rules of alternative offers game of how to slice the  
welfare pie, when the pie is desirable for both parties, the negotiators (bargainers) changing 
roles commit to offers ( )y,x , 1=+ yx . Setting up the game, the rules and regulations of 
social agencies, valid for financing a desirable level of subsidies, require, in contrast, an  
additional control by a poverty line parameter ξ . Such a requirement is a separate matter 
connected to the size of the pie. The way of putting the matter is to suppose that higher  
values of the poverty line need an increased taxation )x,(ξτ  to finance subsidies through 
tax channels with excessive burden of tax rate )x,(ξτ  upon the poverty line ξ  increase, 
0>′ )x,(ξτξ , 0>′′ )x,(ξτξ , constx = . 
The subsidy 0>),(s σξ  compensates for the unfair subsistence of the poor agent ξσ <  
and is a supplement for the poor to compose the eligible "poverty basket" for food, clothing 
and shelter, fuel and lights, …etc. In lines with Rawls [1971: 92] that "primary goods are 
things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever he wants," we define the expecta-
tion of social agencies by level )x,(u ξ , called also the level of basic goods, the guaranteed 
social minimum or cost of living. All but not expenses on subsidies represent the expectation 
)x,(g ξ  of public agencies, what we already named above as "public goods." Provided the 
negotiators commit to the slice x , here and further on, we suppose that level u  is a single  
∩-peaked upon ξ  increase. Expectation g  of public agencies are decreasing with x  but  
increasing with ξ . Expectations g,u  in detail, c.f. Fig. 1-2, are considered to be analytic 
functions )x,(u ξ , )x,(g ξ  as follows. Given an interval [ ]21 ξξξ ≤≤ , called later on the 
scope of negotiations, u  supposed to be single peaked, 0<′′ξu  upon ξ  increase, 
01 >′ )x,(u ξξ , 02 <′ )x,(u ξξ . Upon x  increase utilities u  are convex, 0>′′xu , 0>′xu . Upon 
ξ  increase utilities g  are concave with 0>′ξg , 0>′′ξg . In contrast, utilities g  decrease 
upon x  increase either with 0>′′xg  or 0<′′xg . 
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Stabilization module: Stable policies of social agencies. The main responsibility of the pro-
vision and delivery of welfare goods lies in the public sector, which counteracts negative 
contingency, if it occurs. It is universal in the sense that the entire population is covered by 
the public sector intervention, regardless of one's situation before or after the contingency. 
The benefits are of high quality, enough to support social minimum, Greve (2008: 58);  
poverty is not allowed. This course provides a relatively high level of public spending, high 
level of taxes and governments’ budget deficit in balance with expenses on welfare, i.e.,  
a fiscal inconsistency or misbalance with tax returns. In addition to the level of welfare meas-
ured largely independently of market forces this might have an adverse effect of the market 
economy, which should not be borne by the individual alone since the State has duty to help. 
Let us try to give the situation a sugar pie game analogy. When HE and SHE have signed an 
agreement, the size of the pie has been prescribed by HIM and remained unchanged (stable) 
under the delivery to its end destinations. We intend to go through similar situation: first party 
to prescribe the size and to propose a slice of pie, the other accepts or rejects. The game  
continues: the other to propose a slice but has only one authority to recommend the size what 
the first party may not obligated to accept. The first party, under any such agreement, has a 
commitment to the slice without a commitment to the size. In this way within the scope of 
negotiations the agreement is reached. In case the pie is changing too rapidly, both players 
know that under the delivery the size might change. Is it true that the size instability might 
confuse negotiators in making decisions? The difficulty may be that such instability may drive 
the fair bargain to unknown destiny. In fact, subsidies could smooth out the balance of  
payments! The welfare pie is not stable, and thus may break into the behavior of our rational 
negotiators. Therefore, we need a method of splitting the pie of tax returns not only fairly but 
also steadily. Otherwise, in any agreement, the rules and regulations of the game are not  
living up to their claims unless the welfare policies of social agencies do not enforce balance. 
We need a criterion of how to detect the stability. 
In our further discussions, an issue that justifies the set-up involves quantification. We take a 
quantum of average income for the measurement of all variables and functions over income 
distributions family ),(P ξσ  parameterized by poverty line ξ . Hence, the average income 
per capita establishes the ratio scale. 2 
                                                          
2  Monetary scale satisfies an interpersonal comparability of utilities (c.f. Narens and Luce [1983: 249]). 
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It is helpful to focus first on welfare policy without any warranty of stability. The policy 
might be set by the poverty line ξ  to decide who is living in poverty and to transfer wealth 
from the rich to the poor: the variable σ  to the left from the line ξ , ξσ ≤<0 , allocates the 
income of the poor; the income of the rich to the right is σ , ∞<<σξ . An agent ξσ <  
claims and receives subsidy or benefits ),(s σξ  in a way that the agent’s disposable income 
ξσξσ =+ ),(s . The agent ξσ =  receives a zero subsidy besides all agents ξσ > .  
In what follows, we study a specific scheme emphasizing the readiness of the society for 
funding public spending. We suppose that averages, in other words subsidies B  per capita 
and taxable income W , depend on poverty line parameter ξ ; )(BB ξ≡ , )(WW ξ≡ . Next, 
suppose that negotiators in the welfare game prefer to commit to the slice x  and will agree to 
hold the balanced way of financing subsidies B , i.e., )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅= , where )(W ξτ ⋅  
is the size z  of the pie. Based on the perception of income distributions family ),(P ξσ , the 
product )(W ξτ ⋅  estimates the tax revenue, i.e., the size z  of the welfare pie; )(W ξ  is the 
average taxable income; we call )(W ξ  – the wealth. Let the average of the cost of subsidies 
is )(B ξ , and the average cost of public goods is )(g ξ . Public spending equals the size of 
the pie )(W)( ξτξ ⋅=z  whereas )(g)(B)(W ξξξτ +=⋅ , what means that the revenue is 
spent, and the delivery of public, i.e., basic and public goods, has reached its end. 
Let the social agencies are ready to finance subsidies, i.e., to refund )(B ξ  via tax revenue 
)(W ξτ ⋅ . The agencies commit to keep the balance )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅=  of payments  
between credits )(B ξ  and debts )(Wx ξτ ⋅⋅  as a portion x  of revenue )(W ξτ ⋅ . The  
balance specifies an effect of policy ξ , poverty line ξ , welfare policy, welfare reform, pact, 
program, etc. Although the balance is valid, it might break ahead of the beginning – policy ξ  
bids fair of being unstable towards adjustment in ξ . As far as the balanced way of payments 
for funding subsidies is required, only a few would question the balance; however, almost 
every one, perhaps for different reasons, prefers a stable way to implement the balance. Our 
focus next is on a constraint that embodies the stability of welfare policy ξ ; in other words, 
embodies a criterion for a safe delivery of the pie to its end destinations. 
The problem arises: the size of the pie could vary too fast, what may require frequent  
adjustments of taxes. Rules and regulation for the delivery of basic (primary) and public 
(non-primary) goods do not provide an adequate funding of the expenses, i.e., do not match 
the rules of taxation, nor prevent numerous changes and adjustments. The study emphasizes 
that the pie being on delivery must be controlled and adjusted steadily. We proclaim a simple 
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rule for the decision to be stable: We demand, if the first decision is implemented, the second 
one taken by the same protocol must coincide with the first. Such schemes 
)X(C))X(C(C =  known as idempotence decision rules )X(C  originate from social 
choice mechanisms. In our vocabulary, appendix A, this means that multiple adjustments of 
rules and regulations do not change the machinery of how the subsidies are legally paid out, 
and, in particular, implemented twice give the same result. Here we came upon a sequence 
,...",'..., ξξ of poverty lines multiple adjustments. Such an understanding requires, in particu-
lar, that stable poverty lines, coming in pairs amid the sequence, will coincide at some point. 
One can say, then, that the economy is immune against volatility )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅≠  of 
the balance for subsidies. That is to say that the immunity holds down the welfare hazard in 
the environment of rules and regulation of basic goods on delivery. Likewise, implementing 
the policy ξ  under immune or stabilized composition [ ])(W),(B ξξ   is like saying that, to 
make sure the balance, it requires implementing the rules and regulations of the policy only 
once. For this reason, we assume that the stability of the balance has been secured.  
In this mode, the rules and regulations reflect the policy ξ  that outlines the stabilization of 
public spending by which the policy might be brought to conclusion. We therefore conclude 
that the account of expenses )(Wx ξτ ⋅⋅  meant for social spending must be in balance not 
only for funding subsidies )(B ξ , when the particular policy ξ  takes effect, but also in the 
whole spectrum of current and future events; the policy ξ  enforces the stability in future. 
The balance )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅=  is a static relationship leading to functional dependency 
)(Wx
)(B)x,( ξ
ξξττ
⋅
=≡  binding ξ  and x  variables. Now, the tax τ  becomes a function of 
ξ  and x , )x,(ξττ ≡ . Agent ξσ =  after-tax position is ( ) ( ) φφξττξπ +−⋅−= 1),( , 
where ϕ  is the personal allowance establishing a single tax bracket [ )∞,φ  (c.f. Malcomson 
[1986: 266]). According to rules and regulations valid for tax schedules in the moment, the 
dependency )x,(ξττ ≡  transforms ),( τξπ  into fiscally realistic social minimum 
))x,(,( ξτξπ . Let the level u  of basic goods (the minimal cost of living) highlights the  
expectation of social agencies. However, the cost u  of living does not necessarily match the 
fiscal level ))x,(,( ξτξπ ! Therefore, to avoid this undesirable incident, if one prefers realis-
tic and stable rules, an equation for stable poverty line ξ  should be resolved as necessary 
condition for stability in the future, as follows. 
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Observation 1. Constraint ))x,(,(u ξτξπ=  is the necessary condition to uphold a  
dynamic stability of the static balance )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅= . 
All proofs are in the appendix B. 
Corollary. Adjustments ,'ξ  ,..."ξ  are unnecessary if ))x,(,(u ξτξπ=  resolves for ξ . 
The only chance, remaining for agents with incomes ξσ <  or ξσ > , to change their social 
positions is irrational, and thus the root ξ  allows to prevent the welfare hazard effect.  
Stable policy ξ  induces a stabilized composition [ ])(W),(B ξξ  , which is the basis for the 
welfare game solutions. A reasonable question now emerges: "Which policy ξ  represents a 
stable averages for subsidies )(B ξ  and for taxable income )(W ξ  respectively?" 3 The  
answer is in the following three constraints: 
Delivery constraint, all taxes are spent, i.e., the  
delivery of basic and public goods reached  
its end; this form of constraint makes sense only  
for proportional, or flat taxes. The case will  
later substantially simplify the method of function  
minimization with constraints. 
 g)(B)(W +=⋅ ξξτ  (1) 
The balance for funding subsidies with  
the portion x  of the welfare pie (tax revenue)  
credited to and deposited (debited) in  
social agencies’ account; )(B ξ  is the  
average of subsidies shifted by the policy ξ . 
 )(Wx)(B ξτξ ⋅⋅=  (2) 
The constraint verifying safe delivery of subsidies, 
i.e., the dynamic stability of (2). In contrast to 
( ) 2ℜ∈τσ , , we distinguish levels ),(u τξπ=   
as indifference curves ( ) 2ℜ⊂ℜ∈τξ , ! 
 ( ) ( ) φφξτ +−⋅−= 1u  (3) 
Taking the expression 
)(Wx
)(B)x,( ξ
ξξτ
⋅
≡  out from constraint (2) and replacing 
)(Wx
)(B
ξ
ξ
⋅
 
into ))x,(,(u ξτξπ= , constraint (3) must resolve but for stable policy ξ : 
 ( ) ( ) 0=⋅−⋅−⋅−= )(Wux)(B)u,x,(L ξξξφξξ : . (4) 
Constraint (4), also called volatility constraint, sets up the stabilization module. It holds 
down the welfare hazard effect by balance (2) in amalgamation with constraint (3). 
                                                          
3  Below we continue to call the average taxable income – the wealth. 
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Summary. An outcome g,u,,,x,, ταξφ z⇒  constitutes the citizens’ bargaining shield for 
wealth circulation that relates to a bundle of variables or constants. Controls, variables 
ξφ , ; the status is set to τα ,,x,  z ;  g,u  embodies competing expectations (proposals): 
φ  –  the personal allowance establishing single tax bracket [ )∞,φ ; 
it is an ex-ante, a control (tuning) variable, ξφ <=< const0 ; 
ξ  –  the poverty line; a policy to decide who is living in poverty,  
the choice or the control parameter as well; 
z   – the size of welfare pie )(W ξτ ⋅=z , the tax revenue z  equals  
public spending; the case of proportional taxes; 
x  –  the slice of welfare pie z ; a portion x  of z  to be deposited in  
favor of social agencies for funding subsidies, 10 ≤≤ x ; 
α  –  the negotiating power of social agencies, 10 ≤≤α ; 
τ  –  the marginal tax rate, the wealth tax function )x,(ξτ  is set up by (1); 
u  –  the guaranteed social minimum, the level of basic goods, monetary  
expectation function )x,(u ξ  of social agencies is set up by (2) and (3); 
g  –  the monetary expectation function )x,(g ξ of public agencies is set up  
by (1) and (2); all but not expenses on subsidies, amount of public goods. 
• The slice x  and the marginal tax rate τ , due to constraints (1-3), became functions of  
variables g,ξ : )g,(xx ξ≡  and ))g,(x,( ξξττ ≡ . This form of dependence appears  
later at the module of welfare pie bargaining. 
• In order to perform simulations, the formulas for average cost )(ξB  of subsidies and  
average taxable income )(ξW  may be additionally parameterized by ex-ante parameter θ  
given over distribution families )h,(P ξθσ ⋅+  in a more specific form,  
 σξθσσξξ
ξ
d)h,(P),(s)(B ⋅⋅+⋅= ∫
0
, ),(s σξ  is the subsidy function; 
 ( ) ( ) σξθσφσσξθσφσξσξ ξ
ξ
d)h,(Pd)h,(P),(s)(W ⋅⋅+⋅−+⋅⋅+⋅−+= ∫ ∫∞
0
, 
where the h -factor reveals the inverse working incentives – the feedback of social clients. 
• In our welfare pie game, the policy ξ  in general is also an issue of the average income 
)h(a ξθ ⋅+  maintenance to uphold the restraint )(W)h(a ξξθ >⋅+  by proper choice 
of the personal allowance constant 0>φ , the tax bracket [ )∞,φ . 
• The income density function ),(P θσ  reflects the initial position when the circulation of 
wealth through tax channels just starts. If triggered by the push ξξ >'  or pull ξξ <'  on 
policy ξ , the distribution ),(P θσ  embodies the factor 0=h  hiding the rate of change 
0<⋅+⋅= )h(ah)(Hz ξθξ !  of inverse working incentives, 0>⋅+ )h(a ξθ! , 0<h . 
Policy 'ξ  brings the distribution ),(P θσ  into an undisclosed position )'h,(P ξθσ ⋅+ . 
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Bargaining module: The procedure and policies. In the welfare state there will always be 
disagreement about sharing the pie of tax returns and whether it should be sliced at all –  
policies that will be an impossible task, a wrangling between conflicting groups. Consider 
two flimsy (fictitious) institutions, social agencies acting in the role of negotiators over basic 
(primary) goods and public agencies over public goods. Like in sugar pie game, the expecta-
tions of negotiators’ solely depend on efficient policies of social agencies within the 
framework of how to set the poverty line parameter as precondition for the agreement.  
Indeed, an efficient poverty line sets up a one-to-one corresponding to “binding slices.”  
Accepting the precondition, public agencies will only propose binding slices for obvious  
reason that all but not the lines corresponding to efficient slices will be rejected for sure. We 
exclude, however, the situation when public agencies by negligence, mistake or some other 
reason, or, whatever is done to make the recommendation inefficient, happen to suggest an 
inefficient recommendation, and the other side, prescribing its own efficient line, disregards 
the recommendation but accepts the proposed slicing anyway. Also note, in contrast, that 
even if social agencies will have an intention to disregard an efficient recommendation they 
will not do it because ultimately in any agreement they will be committed to a binding slice 
by a proposition. Therefore, we believe that recommendations on poverty lines provide a  
rational argument what social agencies cannot resist and must accept, or reject making a new 
proposal in standard way. Such an account explains that the outcome of the bargaining game 
might be a desirable poverty line oξ  for both parties, instead of an agreement upon slices. 
Within an interval [ ]21 ξξ , , which we call the scope of negotiations, public agencies would as 
well either accept or reject proposals of efficient poverty lines. Therefore, only the scope 
[ ]21 ξξ ,  bids proposals, which do not need to be accompanied any more by binding slices x  
and, then, the bargaining drama performs exclusively within the interval [ ]21 ξξ , . Expecta-
tions on the interval arrange so-called bargaining frontier, Fig.4-5. This is our unconventional 
idea of how the bargain portfolio is assembled. The portfolio has changed its color; negotia-
tors may be conceived as themselves making poverty line proposals. If rejected the roles of 
actors’ change and a new proposal is submitted. The game continues in a traditional way of 
alternating offers. 
So understood, social agencies propose a slice x  of the welfare pie they commit to, and 
prescribe the maximum level oξ  of the poverty line, which is fiscally possible to hold. Public 
agencies accept or reject the proposal. If rejected, public agencies, as well, make an alterna-
tive proposal y  of a slice they commit to but only recommend the level ξ  for poverty line 
that social agencies are not committed to accept. However, within the scope of negotiations 
[ ]21 ξξ ,  the recommendation ξ  looks like a proposal since rejecting social agencies would 
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violate the commitment x  to the slice they committed to by the agreement. The game  
continues this way; each actor takes turn in making a proposal, x  or y  about the slice and 
prescription oξ  or recommendation ξ  about the poverty line in opposition of the other. 
When a rejection occurs, the momentary phase of the game consolidates a draft. 
Despite one can secure that the rules are stable, the game itself contains a new challenge. 
Increased poverty lines does not necessarily increase the level u  because we believed that 
the welfare hazard ( h -effect) keeps coming up: increased number of claims may have a  
declining effect on social minimum; too many lower income agents may claim subsidies. As 
a result, increased poverty lines will decrease the disposable level of basic goods for the poor 
despite required unavoidable increase of taxes. Provided social agencies commit to slice x  
and public agencies to xy −= 1 , the space of stable social minimums corresponds to points, 
which arrange a single ∩-peaked curve depending on poverty line as a parameter 4. The peak 
oξ  of such a ∩-curve (if the maximum is reachable, what we believe it is) represents an  
efficient welfare policy oξ  of social agencies. Thus, for any fixed slice ox , the bargain  
portfolio will contain an efficient policy oξ  as a function of ox , )x,(u oo ξξ ξ  max arg= . 
Given the other way around, for any efficient policy [ ]21 ξξξ ,o ∈ , which corresponds to a top 
value ou , a unique slice ox  resolves oo u)x,(u =ξ  for x ; ooo g)x,(g =ξ  represents the 
non-conforming expectation of public agencies. We call the slice ox  a binding slice to oξ . 
Depicted in various projections (on expectations oo g,u  at Fig. 4, and on the wealth W  
contra τ  at Fig. 5), efficient peaks oξ , which correspond to binding slices ox , arrange the 
geometry what we call the bargaining frontier. It highlights top values ou  – efficient policies 
of social agencies at peaks oξ . One, perhaps, would recognize here the vocabulary of the 
Laffer curve, but for different domain, similar to: first, "guaranteed social minimum being 
proposed in the normal range of poverty line parameter." Next, "by passing through the top 
point, the poverty proposals will be assessed and reviewed in the range of prohibited values." 
We have looked above at average subsidies )(B ξ  and at average taxable income )(W ξ . 
Now we are ready to see how in our two-man economy the stabilized composition 
[ ])(W),(B ξξ   contributes to the rules and regulations of the welfare game. The composition, 
at the end of the subsection leads to an appropriately settled bargaining problem, which  
associates the risk of a breakdown with the third party (the voter). We have already dealt 
with the rules of the game but now we make two rigorous suppositions. Let us first specify 
the welfare game expectations of all parties involved: 
                                                          
4  We already emphasized the worsening quality of cooking the welfare pie in the welfare policy oven. 
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Expectations of the Negotiators 1 and 2, and the Voter: 
Negotiator No.1,  u   –  level of basic goods, cost of living or a guaranteed  
social minimum to fulfil basic necessities; 
Negotiator No.2,  g  – all but not expenses on subsidies, amount of public goods, 
expectation that benefits all in the society; 
The Voter, q  – risk of higher taxes )x,(ξτ  emanating from electoral  
maneuvering of citizens to break down negotiations. 
Suppose that the rules and regulations to slice the welfare pie include the volatility  
constraint (4), which certifies the stabilized composition [ ])(W),(B ξξ   for policy ξ . This 
assumption is pending on the conclusions of the analysis undertaken above because funding 
the stabilized composition in the welfare game could not be implemented unless the volatility 
constraint 0),,( =uxL ξ  (observation 1). 
Suppose next that varying ξ  under their own rules and regulations social agencies propose 
a stable policy oξ , which for each slice oxx =  they commit to, ensures an effective social 
minimum ),( ),( ooo xuxu ξξ ξmax=  (observation 2) binding ox  to oξ ; no matter who is  
making proposals ox  or oy . Clearly, for each slice oy  proposed by public agencies, social 
agencies reject for sure ineffective recommendation oξξ ≠ ; effective policy oξξ =  must 
occurs at )x,(g),x,(u oooo ξξ  amid binding slices ox  as ongoing precondition for the 
agreement; the procedure was already discussed. Thus, social agencies have no reason to  
reject efficient recommendation oξ  otherwise they cannot keep to eventual commitment ox . 
Observation 3. The curve )x,(g),x,(u ξξ=bS  of effective policies ξ  of social agen-
cies, which certify the stabilized compositions [ ])(W),(B ξξ  , must satisfy the constraint 
 ( ) ( )[ ] 0=⋅−⋅−⋅−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
= )(Wux)(B)u,x,(L)u,x,(D ξξξφξξξξξ : . (5) 
We call the curve bS  a bargaining frontier. We provide the proof of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for constraint (5) in the appendix B. 
It is evident that level u  of basic goods and amount g  of public goods at the frontier bS   
depend but exclusively on policies ξ , bS∈)(g),(u ξξ . Recall that parties are conceived 
then as themselves making proposals over policies ξ , instead of slice-proposals ( )y,x . 
Frontier )g(u=bS  in Fig. 4 illustrates the expectations. Particularly, the constraints 
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0=)g,,(Q τξ  – Delivery  (1); 
0=)u,x,(L ξ  – Volatility (4); 
0=)u,x,(D ξ  – Frontier    (5); 


 
as rules and regulations  
for the welfare game between  
institutions of the welfare state, 
in case of proportional (flat) taxes, following a succession of collections of sub-expressions 
and simplifications, imply an analytical solution, which turns to be without constraints: 5 
( )φξξτξξ −⋅−= )()(u , 
)(W
)()( ξ
ξξτ z= , )(g)(B)( ξξξ +=z ; 
)(B
)(v
)(W)(g ξξ
ξξ −= , where ( ) 


−⋅−+=
)(W
)('W
)(B
)('B)(v ξ
ξ
ξ
ξφξξ 1 ; 
±  rates 0≤)('W ξ , 0≥)('W ξ  of changes in )(W ξ  are essential for the analysis, whereas 
function )(B ξ  is valid only with 0>)('B ξ , and ξφ <<0 . 
Now, so understood, the bargain portfolio contains a scope [ ]21 ξξ ,  for negotiations that 
parties will follow in traditional way. Social agencies propose [ ]21 ξξξ , ∈ ; public agencies 
either accept or reject. If rejected the roles of actors’ change and public agencies make an  
effective recommendation – a proposal ξ  to social agencies. The game continues changing 
roles until a proposal ξ  is accepted. The policy ξ  on poverty, or the poverty line, is a control 
parameter of policy rules and regulations. From now on, we refer to efficient policy ξ  as to a 
proposal of policy on poverty when the bargaining over slices ( )y,x  of the welfare pie in 
eventual agreement is under negotiations. 
Before we go any further, let us recollect the phenomenon of risk the voter creates for  
negotiators. Recall that rejecting proposals negotiators consolidate a draft, see above. It is a 
risky moment to continue the bargain. The voter may vote against the draft, emanating a risk 
of breakdown when negotiators try to continue bargaining over too costly proposals without 
fulfilling the terms of the voter, and the game ends with disagreement or the breakdown. In 
lines with Osborn and Rubinstein, "We can interpret a breakdown as the result of the inter-
vention of a third party, who exploits the mutual gains. A breakdown can be interpreted also 
as the event that a threat made by one of the parties to halt the negotiations is actually real-
ized. This possibility is especially relevant when a bargainer is a team (e.g. government), the 
leaders of which may find themselves unavoidably trapped by their own threats." (1990: 72). 
                                                          
5  Mathematical derivation available on request 
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Suppose that negotiators bargain over all stable policies ξ  within the scope of negotiations 
[ ]21 ξξ , , [ ]21 ξξξ , ∈ . Below we follow the alternating-offers game )q(Γ  with an  
exogenous risk q , 10 << q , of breakdown (Osborne and Rubinstein [1990: 71-76]).  
Each time the proposal ξ  is rejected by one of the negotiators, the momentary phase  
of the game consolidates a draft. Negotiators do not feel safe to continue bargaining  
upon the draft if the terms of voter are not met since voter-citizens (taxpayers) may  
vote against the draft emanating a risk q  of breakdown. The worst-case scenario 
{ })(gg),(uu,)(gg),(uu 22221111 ξξξξ ====  extracted from the endpoints 21 ξξ <  of 
bargaining frontier bS  naturalizes the risk 0>q  of breakdown. 
A closer look at what is known the "well-defined bargaining problem," or individual ration-
ality, associated with the traditional definition d,S  of the bargaining scheme, seems to be 
instructive. Indeed, inequalities 21 gg > , 21 uu <  hold for the pair 2211 gd,udd ===  
composed from endpoints 11 g,u  and 22 g,u  of the bargaining interval [ ]21 ξξ , . The point 
d , introduced here, naturalizes the disagreement point of the problem d,bS , 
1ℜ⊂bS . 
Then, compared to traditional approach of compact convex set 2ℜ⊂S , inequalities ds >  
are also true for any pair bS∈s . Therefore, the pair d,bS  for the bargaining frontier bS  
becomes a well-defined bargaining problem. However, it is not immediately apparent, 
whether the point d  is a stable. Following observation rules out such a doubt. 
Observation 4. To testify whether the point 2121 g,ud,dd ==  becomes a stable  
outcome of the welfare pie game, it is necessary and sufficient that there exists a policy δ  on 
poverty, which resolves the equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 012 =⋅−−+⋅− )(Wdd)(B δδδφδ ; (6) 
condition [ ]21 ξξδ , ∉  is necessarily required.  
Notice that in the worst-case δ  the average amount of wealth circulating in society is 
)(W δ ; the average cost for funding subsidies is )(B δ . Proposal δ  depends on endpoints 
of the interval [ ]21 ξξ , . This dependence, if equation (6) can be resolved for δ , provides the 
basis for validation of equity condition of breakdown, next section. 
Finally, what follows is the proper choice of expectations in the alternating-offers game 
with a risk q  of breakdown, Osborn and Rubinstein, (1990: 75), encapsulating the bargain-
ing power α  of negotiators for an appropriately settled bargaining problem. 
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Observation 5. In the alternating-offers game )q(Γ  with the risk 0>q  (probability)  
of breakdown 21 d,d  the functions ( )αξ 1d)(u −  and ( ) αξ −− 12d)(g  imply the expectations  
of social and public agencies accordingly. The solution λ  of the well-defined bargaining  
problem d,bS  is close to the pair ),( 21 λλ , 21 λλλ ≤≤ , resolving equations 
( ) ( )αα λλ 1211 )()()1( duduq −=−⋅−  and ( ) ( ) αα λλ −− −=−⋅− 1211221 d)(gd)(g)q(  for  
variables 21,λλ ; without proof. 
Unanimous consent module: Electoral maneuvering. Only the voting results can reveal 
what are the true incentives of citizens that give the democracy its final judgment, so it is 
through the democratic process the voters step up in the roles of actors to whom the opportu-
nity is granted to govern institutions and who intend to act in people's interest to allocate 
optimally the social and public resources. It is voters’ inequalities, life plans, social class and 
origin, native endowments, political capital, etc., which determine what bulletin to collect at 
the voting table. As consequences of this, voters’ reasonable disagreements or interpretations 
of reality that advance voters’ own choice would affect electoral maneuvering and thus the 
voting result. The results are not totally predictable because there are always unpredictable 
deviations in voters’ political views and opinions of how the wealth redistribution ought to be 
organized. Trouble is that welfare proposals, which benefit all, sometimes require higher 
taxes but our negotiators (social and public agencies) would be confronted with taxpayers’ 
selfish attitude towards lower taxes. Such an attitude deserves, perhaps, critical examination 
– emphasis that will personalize taxpayers acting as well in the role of a representative voter. 
Given these points our question is: Why the negotiators should care about lower taxes? 
The situation is well suited to introduce electoral maneuvering of taxpayers bringing about 
an external threat q , 10 << q , of breakdown by the bargaining game )q(Γ  (Osborn and 
Rubinstein, 1990: 72). Indeed, sufficient to finance the expectations of our rational negotia-
tors for different taxes τ , the Fig. 5 depicts the curve of efficient welfare policies (poverty 
lines) into the space of taxable income (the wealth) W  and the income tax τ . The pair 
g,u  is embedded in each point but not visible on the graph. These invisible pairs in the 
upper part of the graph symbolize lower basic (primary) but higher public (non-primary) 
goods, the lower part symbolize lower public but higher basic goods. As we believe, all 
views are represented, then, the expectations g,u  of negotiators for each tax τ  (in voters’ 
view) are better off for some coalitions of voters against others. Herby, efficient poverty lines 
resulting from eventual agreements between negotiators are two-folded. Some voters (now in 
negotiators view) will accept higher, others prefer lower taxes. Therefore, the "upper coali-
tions" of voters will always disagree with "lower coalitions" unless the tax is too high. For 
lower taxes, disagreements may drop off and vanish totally at the tax minimum. Thus, the 
taxes higher than minimum, emanate a risk of breakdown that some voters will reject the 
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draft to the agreement reached in the momentary phase of the game, see above. The lowest 
tax, then, is the one among many necessary conditions for the draft to pass by unanimous 
consent. Given the probability q  about voters’ dissatisfaction of the draft, the risk 0>q  is, 
however, a rough characteristic of the situation. 
We have not yet passed by all the troubles to avoid, if possible, the risk of breakdown.  
A number of efficient welfare policies wait to be put into the bargain portfolio but only the 
minimum tax is desirable (see Table 1, 0=q ). Indeed, negotiators may overlook the choice 
of voters because the minimum tax is not necessarily a desirable welfare policy in negotiators 
view. It may happen against voters’ free will, that the power of social or public agencies, as 
negotiators, is strong enough in making selfish decisions favorable either for social or public 
agencies alone. Here the bargaining power indicator α , 10 <<α , of social agencies comes 
into consideration; α−1  signifies the bargaining power of public agencies. To be sure that 
the power α  must be adjusted satisfactorily towards desirable outcome, i.e., towards the 
minimum tax (as it was in our sugar pie game with the desired half of the pie when the whole 
pie was suitable to be put in the oven) we adjust the power indicator α  in a way that the 
minimum tax inherits the balance of power between social and public agencies. This means 
that the rules and regulations of agencies activities have to be adjusted accordingly. 
Hereby, we arrived at an idea of the resemblance between the sugar pie game, when two 
highly pragmatic people try to slice a sugar pie, and the welfare pie game, when social and 
public agencies try to slice the welfare pie. The voter, who represents taxpayers refunding the 
pie, votes only for or against the draft accepting or not the momentary phase of the negotia-
tions. The policy λ , which minimizes the wealth tax, is what voters are seeking. We adjust 
the bargaining power α  of social agencies to make sure that the slice of welfare pie would 
be also set so that it safeguards the outcome of negotiations to be the standard bargaining  
solution λ . In doing so the outcome of alternating-offers game )q(Γ  also safeguards the 
same solution λ  when 0=q , which we are going for to avoid the risk 0>q  of breakdown 
associated with electoral maneuvering of taxpayers as voters. 
Marginal tax minimization, i.e., the wealth-tax minimum at the bargaining frontier, is the 
voters’ preference desirable by all members in the society. Following our analytical solution 
without constraints and extracting the τ  expression from (1), the frontier )g(u=bS  is a 
curve )(g),(u ξξ  by which shape the voters’ preference turns into problem:  
 [ ] )(W
)(g)(B)(, ξ
ξξξτξξξ +≡∈   21min . 
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Observation 6. Condition [ ] )(, ξτλ ξξξ    21∈= min arg  is necessary to put forward a poverty 
proposal λ  before voter-citizens by unanimous consent. At the bargaining frontier bS ,  
proposal λ  outlines a unique outcome  z bS∈⇒ )(g),(u),(,,x,, λλλταξφ . 
Provided )(ξτ  is smooth enough, the solution of the voter problem is the root λ  of the 
equation 0=)(' ξτ . The root λ  allows settling the negotiation power α  of social agencies 
in their negotiations with public agencies in a way that rules and regulations of α  are suffi-
cient to persuade public agencies to agree upon social minimum )(u λ . 
Indeed, putting a new spin on the old idea of the sugar pie game of how to adjust the  
bargaining power appears to be clear. The old standard affecting HIS negotiating power α  
can be the new standard for social agencies to affect their negotiating power α  in the  
welfare game. Let ( ) ( ) αα ξξαξ −−⋅−= 121 d)(gd)(u),(f . Recall that we must first take 
the derivative of ),(f αξ  with respect to ξ  evaluating ),(f αξξ  ′ , and then we must replace 
ξ  by λ  (do not replace ½=ξ  this time like in the case of the sugar pie game). Now, the  
negotiating power α  of social agencies must solve the equation 0=′
=
),(f αξ λξξ   for α . 
5. Equity condition of breakdown 
The breakdown in the game )q(Γ  is an initial environment upon which the players of the 
game do not have any influence. In our case the initial environment, when the negotiations 
start, takes account of taxes τ  and the wealth W . The product )(W)( ξξτ ⋅  identifies the 
size z  of the pie within an interval [ ]21 ξξ ,  named the scope of negotiations. The scope 
[ ]21 ξξ ,  establishes the boundary for negotiators, i.e., their initial, most favorable proposal 1ξ  
for public agencies, which is the most negative for social agencies; proposal 2ξ  offers exactly 
the opposite. It is like saying what is the most favorable for one party is the most negative for 
the opposite, and other work around. 
Since the adjustment of power indicator α  of negotiators comprises the breakdown point 
2121 g,ud,dd ==  allegedly given exogenously, it seems suitable to continue the analy-
sis. In trying to extract the point, which is conditionally encoded but endogenously into the 
income distributions family ),(P ξσ  6, we are working here upon specific form for equity 
normalizing the breakdown under the description valid in the alternating-offers game )q(Γ . 
                                                          
6 Note that the breakdown is a pair of pairs{ }2211 g,u,g,u . 
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Traditionally, the disagreement (breakdown) in the alternative offers game are the payoffs 
when one player gets all and the other gets nothing and visa versa. In accordance with  
players’ non-conforming expectations, like in sugar pie game, the first player in our scheme 
acts on behalf of the second. Therefore, it is important for the second player to arrange the 
terms of the contract in a way that the first player does not exploit or misuse its skills and 
abilities to win some advantages for nothing. In the bad end the quality and the size of the pie 
should preferably be equal for both players’ because they will eventually posses the whole 
pie (the first player or the other) independently of circumstances when the breakdown  
happens. The standard bad end corresponds to a pair of pairs { }1001 ,,,  of utilities. In this 
form the breakdown is usually found using normalization by an ex-ante linier transformation. 
The standard breakdown, in particular, is an equity representing an exogenous environment, 
in which the players cannot and will not make binding agreements. However, in our case the 
breakdown environment includes additional parameters – the tax τ  and taxable income W  
upon which the players can agree a priori in order to equalize (normalize) the quality and the 
size of the pie in case the bad end of negotiations is a reality. Without a priori knowledge or 
warranty of equity existence, such normalization is unrealistic. Therefore, in view of taxpay-
ers electoral maneuvering, it is certainly better, to set the breakdown according to some 
rational principle. Below, and finally, we contribute to, if possible, implementing typical 
cost-benefit rationality of how to set the breakdown endogenously. 
Consider a situation of expectations driving the welfare policy in the context of cost-benefit 
analysis. The differences in the amounts of wealth and taxes for funding low-cost welfare 
policy 1ξ  against an expensive policy 2ξ , 21 ξξ < , i.e., funding expectations 21 g,u  for 1ξ  
against 22 g,u  for 2ξ , 21 uu < , 21 gg > , could amplify misunderstandings among negotia-
tors and contribute to delays. Indeed, we already know that public spending )( 1ξz , )( 2ξz  or 
the sizes of the welfare pie at the endpoints of the scope of negotiations [ ]21 ξξ ,  would  
require delivery of wealth )(W 1ξ  and )(W 2ξ  amounts for taxes )( 1ξτ  and )( 2ξτ . These 
amounts and taxes have been settled prior to the start of the game: In mundane terms, the 
wealth and prices for the delivery of needed supplies of commodities to its end destinations, 
which safeguard the expectations 111 g,us =  and 222 g,us = . This interpretation clearly 
emerges from the definition of the size of the pie, which equals to W⋅τ . Such an interpreta-
tion, however, is only thinkable for flat (proportional) taxes. In order to bring the negotiators, 
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if possible, into just and equal positions prior to negotiations, it might be rational to equalize 
wealth amounts W  and taxes τ  at 1ξ  and 2ξ . Therefore, the condition )()( 21 ξτξτ = , 
)(W)(W 21 ξξ = , highlights the equity in the positions of negotiators prior to negotiations 
starts. In particular, such a consideration will equalize prior to negotiations fiscally realistic 
demands for public spending, i.e., the size of welfare pie )()( 21 ξξ zz = . We do not claim 
that the equity can be reached in all circumstances, but we found a number of examples 
where the validity of the condition was detected. 
Let us turn to the Fig. 5 once again to highlight the situation. In the following lines of  
reasoning, we label the condition an equity of breakdown associated with electoral maneuver-
ing of taxpayers. Thus, the exercise would be to fix an interval [ ]21 ξξ ,  solving a system of 
two non-linear equations: )(W)(W 21 ξξ =  and )()( 21 ξτξτ =  for two variables 1ξ  and 2ξ , 
i.e., to find a point ( )** ,W τ  where the bargaining frontier crosses its own contour on the 
plain with τ,W  as XY-axis coordinates. Although this not a hard exercise to quantify the 
cross point ( )** , 21 ξξ , we did not explained away the problem of the existence of breakdown 
point )(g),(ud,d ** 2121 ξξ= . Nevertheless, we found this point in a number of cases. 
Finally, a conjecture would be observed true by example or simulations like one below. 
Conjecture. Under the condition of equity of breakdown, the policy η  on poverty with equal 
power of social and public agencies, as negotiators, minimizes the wealth )(W ξ  (average 
taxable income) channeled via the tax system: [ ] )(W, ξη ξξξ     21∈≈ min arg . 
6. Concluding remarks 
It is time to review the knowledge that the welfare pie game brought to us. We followed the  
welfare policy pushing along the edge of poverty line to reimburse the needy, and to treat 
them fairly, deciding who needs subsidies, which we considered from the point of view of 
the cost of living. Then we revised a way of how to estimate the expenses on basic (primary) 
and public (non-primary) goods. Together, these estimates become functions of poverty line 
as a parameter. Elevated poverty line gave rise to inverse working incentives, called welfare 
hazard (feedback effect) or h -factor, which unbalanced the budget on delivery of public 
goods. For this reason, the budget under the scheme of stable subsidies becomes crucial to 
coordinate the welfare game. 
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Setting up the game, we used incomes to serve the self-interest of agents. We addressed, 
then, the public finance problem of wealth redistribution among agents with lower incomes 
against those with higher incomes. The root of the problem was to find a solution in the  
alternating-offers game with two actors having conflicting interests and representing the  
public institutions pursuing their own causes. Social agencies acted their role by arguing to 
put in all efforts to increase the poverty line. The public agencies’ expectation, in response to 
the public will, was to meet the need for public goods. Electoral maneuvering against higher 
taxes emanated risk to break down negotiations, and the threat of breakdown was the only 
driving force in favor of taxpayers. In doing so, we gave credit to the tax system to guarantee 
reasonably high social minimum disposable for the poor. It is now an elementary exercise to 
find that arguments, demanding an increase in the poverty line, are weak since too costly 
proposals require a raise of funding to subsidize an increased number of low-income agents 
claiming benefits. Increased number of claims may have a declining effect on the quality of 
social services guaranteed for the poor. Hereby, if the decline is undesirable, we cannot any 
more demand an increase of tax returns, and must restrict the scope of negotiations to a  
reasonable interval of poverty lines related to our bargaining procedure. 
Bearing all these circumstances in mind, our message was a pretext for the analysis of the 
domain and the extent of bargain portfolio of institutions in the welfare state. Building on the 
prerogatives of the so-called tripod-scheme embedded into the welfare policy of the state, we 
embodied from the scheme the actors of an alternating-offers game. Actors were supposed to 
inherit non-conforming expectations and represent institutions. We provided a guide to how 
the decisions ought to be analyzed and interpreted within the scope of poverty lines at the 
bargaining frontier, instead of decisions on portions of tax returns. An adjusted bargaining 
power of actors (institutions) was used in compliance with citizens’ desirable vision and  
ambitions as a solution of the bargaining problem. 
We initially thought that due to the uncertainty of how to select the breakdown point, the 
model could treat the power indicator as a variable given only exogenously. However,  
fortunately enough, we found a condition, at least true in valuable examples, to encode the 
power indicator endogenously, and called it "the equity of breakdown." Last, but not least, 
despite one experiment not making a trend, we presented an evidence for the claim that the 
recognized poverty line, defined as 50% of the median income, is close enough to be  
considered as matching the poverty line minimizing the wealth tax. 
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Postscript. This paper encapsulated our long-term vision and believes of a three-divided 
mind of voter-citizens arguing like three individuals, about the level of basic goods, amount 
of (non-primary) public goods, and taxes. We did not provide empirical and conceptual  
support for the key elements of the scheme. We presumed, however, a fundamental differ-
ence between social security system and public sector providing vital public services but did 
not get the difference from a more primitive utility specification of monetary functions. How 
the income of households is assembled and how they use it, for example, to buy private 
health insurance or services of nursing housing, and why cannot the provision of equivalently 
valued public services be a perfect substitute? All these and similar questions are left apart. 
In short, we did not merit a debate on what was good or bad and what was right or wrong in 
the economic or political environment involving the two agents and a voter. Nevertheless, an 
addendum setting up the list of rules and regulations of how to coordinate the game might be 
informative since these rules led to a well-defined bargaining problem. We solve the problem 
analytically. Brought in as outcomes of the game, these solutions, put differently, assign a 
number of appealing interpretations within the space of poverty line parameter establishing 
the main result of the paper. 
Welfare policy rules and regulations of institutions in the welfare game 
1. The administration of social agencies knew the true and exact incomes of social clients, 
and thus it was required to implement an appropriate auditing regulation. 
2. The behavioral pattern of agents remained endogenous. Agents demarcated themselves 
as rich or poor in compliance with current rules and regulations related to whether to 
compensate for the unfair subsistence of the poor and the needy with subsidies. 
3. The regulation and maintenance of the balance between debts and credits for funding 
subsidies was crucial. Debts and credits remained balanced throughout and in spite of 
volatility in the economy. 
4. Subsidies eligible for claims may become progressively attractive for the needy or  
moderately attractive for the permanent clients, which was likely to be the result of the 
inverse working incentives of agents towards shifting the subsidy budget out of balance. 
In this context, official rules and regulations were necessary to keep the balance, i.e., to 
neutralize so-called welfare hazard ( h -factor) effect. Adoption of these rules and regula-
tions on delivery of public goods predict and enforce a stable policy of public spending. 
5. Rules and regulations of taxation: (a) exclusively proportional (flat) tax, (b) enforced  
tax schedules equaled taxable income, and (c) the tax revenue accumulated via tax 
schedules was spent entirely on public needs; i.e., the delivery of basic and public goods 
has reached its end. 
6. Social agencies’ conduct over poverty lines was self-dependent in a sense that, once  
negotiators were committed to the agreement of how to slice the welfare pie, internal 
rules and regulations of social agencies allowed them to guarantee an efficient level of 
basic goods. Public agencies conduct over the line was only in advisory authority. 
7. In any variety of rules and regulations of how to extrapolate and assess tax revenue,  
income distribution was considered the only legal repository for tax return information. 
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Appendix A: Concept of Stability.  
In many-persons games, by a coalition is understood a subset H  of agents Ω  or partici-
pants in H . Among all coalitions Ω2∈H  we usually single out rational coalitions – a 
participant in such coalition extracts from the interaction in the coalition a benefit, which is 
satisfactory for the agent H∈σ . Sometimes it is further stipulated that extraction of this 
benefit is ensured independently of the actions of the players not entering into the coalition. It 
is thinkable that a subset or participants in a coalition can improve their individual positions 
joining some other coalition. Such action is an example of instability. In his work "Cores of 
Convex Games" Shapley (1971: 11) investigated a class of n-person’s games, n=Ω  with 
special convex property, which guarantees an existence of coalitions, participants of which 
cannot improve their positions when joining any other coalition, hereby making such coali-
tions (collection, say the core) stable.  
In contrast to individual payoffs improving or worsening the positions of agents, when 
playing a coalition game, a payoff to a coalition H  as a whole is called the characteristic 
function 0>)H(v . In classical cooperative game theory payoffs )H(v  to coalitions H  are 
known with certainty. The convex property reflects a kind of synergy effect when two coali-
tions S  and T  join together subject to )TS(v)TS(v)T(v)S(v ∩+∪≤+ , called super-
modularity condition; compare super-modularity with Cherenin (1962). In case agent σ  
joins or leaves the coalition H , the increment or decrement { })H(v)H(v)H,( σσπ \−=  
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in the total payoff )H(v  defines the marginal utility )H,(σπ  of an agent H∈σ . This  
expresses an increase/decrease in marginal utility { } )H,()H,( απσαπ ≤\  of membership 
for all σα ≠ , { }σα \H∈  and is analogous to property of returns to scale’ associated with 
convex production functions in economics. Monotonic condition { } )H,()H,( απσαπ ≤\  
is equivalent to convex property of characteristic functions in Convex Game. In current study 
we analyze marginal utilities independently of super-modularity as self-object. This property, 
but inverse, was introduced for computational optimization problems, Nemhauser et al. 
(1978: 269). Therefore, nothing is wrong to look at marginal utilities as individual  
payoffs from the angle of agents post tax position )H,(σπ . It will allow investigating coali-
tions formation analytically. 
Convex property guarantees a relationship between marginal utilities – incentives )H,(σπ  
of participants to join the coalition H , which are necessarily monotonically increasing as the 
coalition grows, so that one might expect a ‘snowballing’ or ‘band-wagon’ effect when the 
game is played cooperatively. Below we investigate coalitions formation using marginal 
utilities in the form of after tax incomes )H,(σπ  of agents σ  looking at the coalition H  in 
view of a tax base H  consisting of active taxpayers. The monotonic property is guaranteed 
provided the tax burden is an inverse function of the tax base H  when the base is shrinking 
or growing, observation 2. 
Our story of tax base stability lies in the State intervention; however, it is still similar to the 
core notion. If not the State, due to snowballing effect, the grand coalition formation (no 
benefits or subsidies are paid out) is immanent. As soon as the State wishes to guarantee a 
social minimum u  to cover cost of living by providing basic goods the situation change. 
Now, one can discover that in terms of coalition game we deal with formation (marginaliza-
tion) of two non-intersecting coalitions Ω=∪HH : those H  who are below the margin ξ  
of poverty line and those H  who stay above. Thus, in contrast to formation of all eventual 
coalitions Ω2∈H , only two (feasible) coalitions Ω=∪HH  are under investigation; cost 
of living )H,(u ξπ=  is defined as post tax position of an agent ξσ =  having an income 
equal to the poverty line ξ . All agents σ  above poverty line ξ , ξσ >  receive payment 
)H,(σπ , all ξσ ≤  receive the payment equal to social minimum u . 
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Trying to implement the coalition game theory to just described scheme of payoffs, the post 
tax position )H,(σπ  of an agent is a personal payoff, which represents a marginal utility 
with monotone property – the pie of tax returns increases when a new taxpayer joins the  
coalition H  of active taxpayers and visa versa. Coalitions of taxpayers in ordinary vocabu-
lary are already called the tax base H . Indeed, joining a tax base of active taxpayers improve 
the position of all citizens, leaving the base H  results in additional transfer payments to the 
needy H∉σ  increasing the tax burden upon those who still stay in the coalition (active  
taxpayers) by decreasing their post-tax position. We already dealt with the marginalization of 
income level. Therefore, the welfare system intervention in the form of transfer payments 
will interact into incentives of agents in two directions. In the first, those who find them  
better off due to monotone property of their post-tax position will try to join the coalition of 
active taxpayers, and those in opposite direction will try to join to participants who receive 
transfer payments, the needy. Now, the problem to answer the question of stability emerges, 
e.g., when this process stops – no one can and intend to claim subsidies legally and no one 
wishes to leave the tax base H . Provided the marginalization occurs at poverty level ξ , the 
situation becomes stable and the delivery of basic goods reaches its destination safely. Such a 
situation may be understood, also, as rules and regulation of welfare system, which do not 
change in the long run of how the transfer payments to be payout. 
To make this concept of stability rigorous we introduce first the notion a rational coalition. 
Let the margin u  be the cost of living. We define coalition H  of agents σ  as rational if for 
all participants H∈σ , the inequality u)H,( ≥σπ  holds. Upon the set of feasible coali-
tions Ω=∪HH , rational or not, define the mapping { }u)H,(H)H(C ≥∈= σπσ . In 
doing so, we extract from a coalition H  those agents )H(CH \∈σ , u)H,( <σπ , who 
need support, and who can legally claim subsides, say the needy. As soon as all needy leave 
the coalition H  and became the members of coalition HH \Ω= , they will find them-
selves better off under the administration of welfare system bringing instability into the tax 
system: the database is now shrinking to the set of agents H)H(C ⊂  because of inequali-
ties )H,())H(C,( σπσπ < , )H(C∈σ . There are, however, no guarantees that for a 
coalition )))H(C(...C(CH =u , which is the result of shrinking process, the chain uH  
would stabilize unless it stops at some point uH : we get )H(CH uu = . Our goal, which we 
try to achieve, sounds like the following. Given the population of all agents Ω  and imple-
menting the chain of mappings )))(C(...C(C Ω  unless the process stops we can marginalize 
in the end the agents in Ω  into two coalitions Ω=∪ uu HH , where )H(CH uu = ; uH   
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becomes a fixed point of the mapping C . Given the marginalization at the level ξ  of an  
income equal to poverty line when the State interacts into the process of coalition formation, 
the marginalization Ω=∪ uu HH  represents a core consisting of two coalitions: the needy 
uH  and active taxpayers uH . In other words, the solution, which guarantees the safe deliv-
ery of basic goods, complies with both, a constraint as fixed point of the mapping C , and the 
core notion. Thus in the end, when the chain stops, the agents have neither intention nor  
reason to leave the coalitions uH , uH ; collection of two sets { }uu H,H  arrange a core in 
classical sense. It was proved, Mullat (1980: 1471), 7 that there exists a unique rational coali-
tion uH  and the chain )))(C(...C(C Ω  highlights the procedure finding the coalition uH  at 
the moment the chain stops. Marginalization in this way represents two-man economy: the 
needy uH  and active taxpayers uH . Moreover, there exist a unique coalition *H  of active 
taxpayers, called kernel, where the cost of living maxu  represents the last fiscal opportunity or 
balanced situation for the State to pay for subsidies; no fiscal solutions maxuu > are available. 
Only one, issue remains, in view of the basic cost of living, to explain the relationship  
between single peakedness of expectations u  of social agencies and the coalition game. We 
emphasized previously a moral-principal that social agencies act on the behalf of public 
agencies. However, the agencies, i.e., the negotiators in bargaining game, have to reach some 
kind of understanding what role they play. For this reason, a slice x  of the welfare pie, which 
is in reality a portion of tax returns, is at least one of items at the agenda upon which both 
negotiators must agree in the form of commitment to the agreement of how to divide the  
welfare pie. A portion x  of the pie under the agreement must go to social agencies and the 
other, equal to x−1 , to public agencies. Given the negotiators will commit to the slice x  in 
eventual agreement, such a consideration guarantees the monotonic property of marginal 
utilities )H,(σπ  when σ  joins or leaves the coalition of active taxpayers H . Thus, carry-
ing on along the curve of excessive burden of taxation, secures the monotonic property of 
marginal utilities, observation 2, as well as the single peakedness of expectations u  of social 
agencies. In case the commitment does not hold it will be unclear in which direction the slice 
is going to move, upstream or downstream, with the welfare pie expansion or shrinking,  
allowing social agencies, despite the tax decrease/increase, to move in opposite direction to 
increase/decrease the subsidies. The situation goes out of control and rational coalitions do 
not exist in the sense described above; the coalition game will not be convex any more. 
                                                          
7 Mullat, J.E. (1979). Устойчивые коалиции в монотонных играх, Автоматика и Телемеханика, №10,  
стр. 84-95, (1980). Automation and Remote Control, Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1469-1478. 
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Appendix B: Verification 
Proof of observation 1. On the contrary, suppose that ))x,(,('uu ξτξπ=> . Let social 
agencies attempt to improve after-tax income 'u  of poverty line ξ . The agencies attempt to 
implement 'uu >  by initiating a regulation for policy ξξ >' . At once, for some highly 
pragmatic agents σ  an option becomes visible to claim for subsidies to be better off because 
of inequalities 'u))x,(,(u >≥ ξτσπ . These pragmatic agents σ  would increase the cost 
)(B)'(B ξξ >  for subsidies and would shift the balance )(W)x,(x)(B ξξτξ ⋅⋅=  onto 
deficit )(W)x,(x)'(B ξξτξ ⋅⋅> ; the balance was valid in the past, whereas in the past 
)(Wx
)(B)x,( ξ
ξξτ
⋅
≡ . Since social agencies must stay committed to x  ( x  is fixed by  
agreement), the only option remains to keep the balance adjusting )x,(ξτ  to 
)x,(
)(Wx
)'(B)x,',( ξτξ
ξξξτ >
⋅
= . Otherwise, keeping the old policy ξ  in tact, the agencies 
could, but cannot, eliminate the deficit through a decrease in x . If ))x,,'(,'(u ξξτξπ>  the 
agencies must continue the adjustment policy of taxes by )x,',()x,",'( ξξτξξτ >  but  
adjusting now upon the welfare policy 'ξ  and proposing '" ξξ >  in order to eliminate a new 
deficit )'(W)x,',(x)"(B ξξξτξ ⋅⋅> . These improvements 'u"uu >>  initiate a sequence 
of policies ,...'"..., ξξ > . and after-tax positions ,...'u"u..., >  . The limit "uu =  with 
"' ξξ = , however, contradicts the assumption that the equation ))x,(,(u ξτξπ=  cannot be 
resolved for ξ ; the sequence ,...'"..., ξξ >  continues forever. ! 
The chain of reasoning with u'u <  is similar. Just follow the instructions below. 
Replace to implement an improved by to make a decline in 
– better off – worse off 
– improve 
improvement 
– decline 
deterioration 
– to claim for subsidies – that the subsidies have been revoked 
– deficit – surplus 
– >≥,  – <≤,   
Transpose: an increase with a decrease  
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In what follows, we investigate stable expectations bS∈g,u  of social and public  
agencies. The bargaining agreement occurs at outcomes g,u,,,x,, ταξφ z⇒  under the 
constraint that the variation of policy ξ  does not improve the position of social agencies – 
the point turns up at the bargaining frontier )g(u=bS . 
For stable outcomes, the variables of income level u , slice x , policy ξ , and tax rate τ   
depend on each other. The slice oxx = , if settled as a possible agreement, redirects the level 
)x,(,(u oξτξπ=  to become a function )x,(uu °= ξ . So, the peak point of level u  with 
regard to the best welfare policy looks like 
 )x,(u oξξ ξ  max  arg=°  (B.1) 
Observation 2. Assume that social agencies do not shift from the slice oxx = . Let the  
volatility constraint (4) solve for two different policies 21 ξξ < . Let the tax sacrifice 
)()x,()x,(t oo φξξτξ −⋅=  be a differentiable function of ξ  progressively increasing with 
ξ  increase within closed interval [ ]21 ξξ , , i.e., the derivatives 
 0
1
>
∂
∂
=ξξ
ξξ )x,(t
o , 0
2
<
∂
∂
=ξξ
ξξ )x,(t
o  and 02
2
>
∂
∂ )x,(t oξξ , 
then the social minimum level )x,(t)x,(u oo ξξξ −=  is single ∩-peaked function of ξ .  
Corollary. There exists a unique interior policy oξ  maximizing u  at 0=
∂
∂
°=ξξ
ξξ )x,(u
o . 
The standpoint coming next concerns the necessary and sufficient conditions for the  
stable policy ξ  to occur at the bargaining frontier. 
Observation 3. Assume that the volatility constraint (4) is differentiable of its  
variables. The income level )x,(uu oξ=  is differentiable and strictly convex with respect  
to the policy ξ  within some closed interval [ ]21 ξξ , . For a stable outcome 
 z oooooo g,u,,,x,, ταξφ ⇒ to occur on the bargaining frontier )g(u=bS , it is neces-
sary and sufficient that the policy °ξ  resolves the equation: 
 (i) 0=
∂
∂
°=ξξ
ξξ )u,x,(L
oo , where )x,(uu ooo ξ=  provided that 
 (ii) 0≠
∂
∂
°=uu
oo )u,x,(L
u
ξ . 
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Proof. Necessity. Let the stable outcome  z oooooo g,u,,,x,, ταξφ ⇒  on the  
bargaining frontier )g(u=bS  maximizes (B.1) at ))x,(,(uu
oooo ξτξ= . Varying  
the policy ξ  around oξ  of the outcome  z oooooo g,u,,,x,, ταξφ ⇒  and  
substituting ))x,(,(uu oξτξ=  into the volatility constraint (4), we obtain  
an identity 0≡)))x,(,(,x,(L oo ξτξπξ . Within the proximity of ( )oo u,ξ , we exhibit for 
variables u,ξ : 
 0=
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ ))x,(,()u,x,(L
u
)u,x,(L ooooo ξτξπξξξξ , (B.2) 
from which we deduce the necessity statement for oξξ =  and ouu = . 
Sufficiency. Suppose the condition (ii) holds. Let (i) resolves for oξ  at the stable outcome 
 z oooooo g,u,,,x,, ταξφ ⇒ . Combining (i) and (B.2), we conclude that 
 0=
∂
∂
°=ξξ
ξτξπξ ))x,(,(
o . 
The sufficiency statement (B.1) holds since )x,(uu oξ=  is a strictly convex function of ξ .! 
Proof of observation 4. The statement is correct as soon as we find a stable policy δ  for 
implementation of the pair 21 d,d . First, replace the variable g  by 2d  in the formula for 
constraint (1). Then, take out the expression for 
)(W
d)(B
δ
δ
τ 2
+
=  from (1) and substitute it 
into ...)( τ−1  of constraint (3), where u  should be replaced by 1d  in advance. By simplify-
ing, we end up with the statement of the observation.! 
Sketch of the proof (observation 6). Looking at the wealth tax value minττ > , for any  
outcome bS∈g,u,...,τ , one may, indeed, prefer a counter outcome as a motion 
'g,'u,...,τ , which outlines g'g,u'u,..., <>τ  or g'g,u'u,..., ><τ . However, since the 
frontier )g(u=bS  is a curve of efficient preferences g,u  for social minimum )g(u , no 
one could put forward a motion ou'u >  or og'g >  against an outcome oomin g,u,...,τ  at 
minττ = . We argue that the only way to fulfil the expectations and requests of taxpayers and 
to carry out the motion is by unanimous consent  )(gg),(uu),(..., oomin λλλττ === .!  
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Appendix C: Income Distribution Analysis 
Bargaining game point of view 
We recommend performing the analysis of income density )(P σ  as follows. 
1. Parameterization of )(P σ  by θ  in the form ),(P θσ . Parameter θ  must keep to the 
original shape )(P σ  of the distribution, but crash it to the right when θ  increases and 
protrude to the left when it decreases. Below we also use a constant m  to make the distri-
bution more equal/flat when m  increases, and a more unequal/peaked like when m  
decreases. Equal/unequal parameterization of the original )(P σ  is not mandatory. 
2. Here, the h -factor inserts the adverse working incentives of agents. Replace the parameter 
θ  by ξθ ⋅+ h , where ξ  represents the policy on poverty and choose 0<h . In doing so, 
the average income )h(a ξθ ⋅+  of the distribution )h,(P ξθσ ⋅+ , as an indicator on 
the provision side of all goods (primary and non-primary, i.e., basic + public), inherits the 
feedback effect of the welfare hazard. To prevent this effect, the social administration 
must know the true incomes of social clients. The administration accepts all eligible 
claims and revokes all ineligible claims. Once the policy ξ  takes effect, an agent with  
*income σ  below ξ  claims and receives the benefits, ξσ < . No benefits at all if ξσ ≥  
or the benefits are revoked even if agents fall under ξ  in the past but are now above ξ . 
The income densities ),(P θσ , as well as the adverse working incentive, hidden in its  
undisclosed position )h,(P ξθσ ⋅+ , both have a characteristic "tail" to the right, which 
is typical for societies sharply divided into very rich and very poor people (Fig. 3). 
3. Selection of the subsidy function ),(s σξ . We emphasize that subsidies eligible for 
claims are paid out as benefits: an agent’s ξσ <  disposable income ξσξσ =+ ),(s .  
A more comprehensive assistance rules could be easily incorporated. 
4. We have already pointed out at the personal allowance φ -constant, 0>> φξ . The 
choice of the constant is of crucial importance to restrain the amount of wealth 
)()( ξθξ ⋅+< haW . Without borrowing or printing money to maintain the wealth )(ξW  
as average taxable income, greater than the average income )( ξθ ⋅+ ha , is impossible. For 
0≈φ  we obtain too sterile, a solution 0≈minτ . In contrast, the condition ξφ  ≈ , if the  
delivery constraint (1) is obligatory, could lead to excessive public spending. 
5. Given )h,(P ξθσ ⋅+ , evaluate the stabilized composition [ ])(W),(B ξξ  . Transform the 
composition using analytical solution into expectations )(g),(u ξξ  of social and public 
agencies accordingly. In doing so we reassign the negotiations to the bargaining frontier 
of poverty lines, instead of slices upon the welfare pie in hope to show the way of how to 
implement the bargaining procedure upon arbitrary income distribution. 
6. It is valuable to get hold of the principle associated with equity of breakdown. Otherwise, 
we run into the shortcomings of the bargaining scheme about the disagreement point 
21 d,dd = . A proper choice of breakdown allows extracting the interval or the scope of 
negotiations [ ]21 ξξ , , 21 ξξ < , internally encoded in distributions )h,(P ξθσ ⋅+ . 
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Example. We proceed with a specific position of welfare state encapsulating an income  
distribution density similar to an exponential function: 
( ) 


⋅+
−⋅


⋅+⋅⋅+
=⋅+
−
ξθ
σ
ξθ
σ
Γξθξθσ hexph)m(h)h,(P
m 11
, where 
14.m = , 911.=θ , 816.)m( =Γ  and 090.h −= . The average income of this σ -density 
equals σξθσσξθ d)h,(P)h(a ⋅⋅+⋅=⋅+ ∫∞
0
; )m(Γ  is an extension of !)m( 1−  to real 
variables. The subsidy 0>−= σξσξ ),(s  supplements the income of the poor up to the 
poverty line. Incorporation of more comprehensive rules of assistance is possible. 
Figure 3.  Income distribution density with characteristic 
"bifurcation phenomenon" around the poverty line 
 
It is worth the efforts to validate that a disagreement policy δ  under the primacy of equity 
principle of breakdown might be an outcome of the game. There is no reason why the  
equation ( ) ( ) ( ) 012 =⋅−−+⋅− )(Wdd)(B δδδφδ , in accordance with observation 4, has 
a solution in general. However, for the particular example of income distribution families 
)h,(P ξθσ ⋅+  (see above), the equation could be resolved. One can check, to be sure, that 
for the wealth 3241.W * =  and the tax %.* 3826=τ , if we use the monetary expectations 
g,u  at the endpoints 910544 11 .g,.u ==  , 2914529 22 .g,.u ==   of the scope 
[ ]1639325 21 .,.   == ξξ  of negotiations, the pair 291544 2121 .g,.ud,dd ==== , 21 uu < , 
11 ud = , 22 gd = , 21 gg > , consolidates the breakdown policy [ ]1639325614 .,..  ∉=δ . 
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Simulation. Recall already known proposals for incomes η , 1λ , λ , 2λ , δ  (bear in mind 
that δ  is outside of the scope of negotiations [ ]21 ξξδ , ∉ ); and a poverty proposal µ21 , as 
follows: 
η  the policy on poverty with equal power of negotiators;  
the social and public agencies are in symmetric positions or equal roles; 
1λ  an alternating-offer of social agencies, what the public agencies accept; 
λ  the poverty line, a policy minimizing public spending;  
minimizing the welfare pie instead of the wealth tax; 
µ21  50% of the median income; µ  such that half the population  
have income above µ , and half have income below that, c.f. Bowman (1973); 
2λ  an alternating-offer of public agencies, what the social agencies accept; 
δ  the most negative outcome: the policy of breakdown or disagreement; the result of 
electoral maneuvering of taxpayers when the draft to the agreement  
about how to set the slice for the welfare pie was rejected by voter-citizens. 
After a quick glance at the table below, we are going to summarize and judge the  
"eventualities of the burden of taxation" by the magnitude and dimension of poverty  
proposals ought to be debated or implemented. 
Table 1.  Numerical experiment behind the bargaining game of  
welfare policy-making and delivery; 8 SA – Social Agencies, PA – Public Agencies 
Obtained by means of income  
distribution density (Fig. 3);  
personal allowance  
φ  = 2.34, θ  = 11.9,  
h = -0.09, m =  4.1 
Policy  
of equal,  
symmetric 
power of  
negotiators  
η  
SA proposal 
accepted  
by PA 
1λ , q = 5% 
Proposal 
minimizing 
wealth tax 
λ , q ≈ 0% 
Poverty 
line, 50% 
of median 
income 
µ½  
PA proposal 
accepted  
by SA 
2λ , q = 5% 
Policy of 
disagree-
ment, the 
breakdown 
δ  
Poverty line–
welfare policy  =ξ  25.45 18.9 17.36 16.76 15.78 4.61 
Poverty rate: percentage of agents 
below the poverty line 
25.65% 10.63% 8.1% 7.2% 5.9% 0.06% 
Negotiating power  
of social agencies  
)(ξα  0.5 0.24 0.2 0.19 0.17 Not  
defined 
Guaranteed  
social minimum 
)(u ξ  20.62 15.57 14.35 13.86 13.08 4.54 
Average of  
public goods  
)(g ξ  6.1 7.23 7.43 7.5 7.62 1.29 
Average taxable 
income, the wealth  
)(W ξ  37.94 38.5 38.75 38.86 39.05 41.47 
Wealth-tax,  
marginal tax rate  
)(ξτ  20.9% 20.09% 20.05% 20.06% 20.09% 3.1% 
Average public 
spending, the size of 
the welfare pie 
)(ξz  7.93 7.73 7.77 7.80 7.84 1.29 
Average income,  
provision indicator )h(a ξθ ⋅+  38.43 40.3 40.71 40.87 41.13 43.74 
                                                          
8 The table suggests a proposal laid out before voter-citizens to vote on. 
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Judgment. A chance behind the welfare game to masquerade economic reality might be the 
answer to the following question: "Is it, nonetheless, true that funding subsidies and keeping 
the budget stable is going to be difficult to match together in case the tax burden for all  
citizens is decreasing?" On the surface, it seems that, at some point, fairness and equity may 
disappear because the rich simply gets richer and the poor gets poorer. The effect of "tax  
relief for the rich" seems to drop down the welfare. In the face of these controversies, no one 
can guess what fallout may result from such eventualities, but we judge that tax relief  
actually guarantees a fair level of wealth. This consideration in the value judgment below 
deserves, perhaps, some emphasis on following four features. 
First, let us suppose that, playing the game, social agencies reached an agreement with  
public agencies. Will the rules and regulations of the game stand any chance of a just and fair 
solution? In Table 1, we present the percentage of agents below the poverty line establishing 
the poverty rate. Taken separately, it is, however, a deeply flawed measurement of justice. In 
fact, when breakdown of negotiations occurs, the solution given by rate 0.06% is allegedly 
the most just and fair!? 
Second, the welfare pie redistribution compensates for the inequalities of agents’ incomes 
up to the poverty line. The poverty line is set by the national government to decide who is 
living in poverty. The official number is adjusted annually according to social minimum to 
take into account increases in the cost of living. Our major assumption was that the variety of 
rules and regulation to prescribe the poverty line in the welfare game are under the social 
agencies mandate, but public agencies set up an advisory authority. Thus, in order to reach an 
efficient policy of guaranteed social minimum, we assumed, then, that social agencies are in 
privileged position allowing them to prescribe the poverty line independently. 
Next to the poverty line, the power indicator α  highlights the amount of resources, skills 
and competence of social agencies, etc., to maintain their duties under the principles as to 
how the state ought to behave when trying to fulfil its welfare mission. We see no value in a 
separate judgment of this interpretation. However, due to public agencies central position of 
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purchasing and delivering vital public services, to impose a higher grade α−1 , 10 ≤≤α , to 
public agencies, but lower grade α  to social agencies, is appropriate. Therefore, adjusting 
the power indicator α  specifically as a desirable outcome, we imbedded the welfare pie to 
suit into fiscally realistic welfare policy aiming to settle the rules and regulations of the game 
closer to legal responsibilities and moral obligations of citizens, what benefits all in society. 
The last feature is the unanimous consent; a situation in which no one can find a reason to 
object a motion to the agreement. To reach consensual agreement is difficult enterprise and 
time-consuming process. In the welfare game with a risk of higher taxes, the consent on  
condition of minimizing taxes brought the problem into focus. In view of agents receiving 
subsidies, a higher tax rate might be the subject of the debates and the most favorable and 
just solution. In contrast, the minimum tax policy for the consumer is out of the question, as 
we assume it is, not least that it is also a just and fair redistribution of wealth without a single 
objection. Therefore, if we agree in the debates upon the rules and regulations of the game, 
the outcome, which minimizes taxes, offers a vision of what policy should entail. To reach 
such an outcome is worth the time and efforts even if the vision is a realistic utopia. 
Now so understood, it goes without saying that entering the realm of obvious utopia, the 
policy =η 25.45 (see the Table 1) with equal power of negotiators is less just and less fair 
than the policy =λ 17.36, where the minimum of taxes is reached; only the policy λ   
on poverty (Fig. 5) has a chance for a vote by unanimous consent. Indeed, in the variety of 
welfare game regulations, when engaged in an interaction to implement equal policy 25.45 
(like HE and SHE engaged to obtain a piece of sugar pie), the equal power =α 0.5 of social 
agencies’ negotiators was stronger than 0.2. Nevertheless, the incident with weakened power 
0.2 is yet to be determined and the aim of customers can still be reached on policy 17.36 for 
the tax rate 20.05% < 20.9%. Thus, regardless of the reduced obligations of taxpayers, social 
agencies, even with their weakened bargaining position, will be able to come to a desirable 
agreement with the public agencies to maintain a fair level of wealth. 
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Figure 4. The monetary 
expectations of social 
and public agencies are 
depicted on the vertical 
and the horizontal axes, 
respectively. The graph 
represents the bargaining 
frontier )g(u=bS  of 
guaranteed social mini-
mum (level of basic 
goods) sloping down 
from the left-top ξ1   
towards right-bottom ξ2. 
It is the projection found 
by resolving the frontier 
constraint (5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. As it follows 
from the graph, present-
ing a motion for a vote 
on the amount W=38.75 
of wealth for the least 
tax τ = 20.05% is a real-
istic proposal that may 
pass by unanimous con-
sent (observation 6). In 
contrast, marked by 
‘‘, the higher tax 
21.32% > 20.05% may 
course a discontent  
because the same tax 
level on wealth refunds 
both: the higher (lower) 
level of basic goods but 
lower (higher) public 
goods, (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
   1.287    3.21    5.133   7.055   8.978 10.901 
The bargaining frontier projection  
29.447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.465 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.482 
 
 
 
 
 
 14.499 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 9.516 
 
 
 
 
4.534 
 
ξ1 = 5.32  
ξ2=39.16 
B 
A 
S 
I 
C 
 
G 
O 
O 
D 
S 
 
L 
E 
V 
E 
L 
The swing of the bargaining frontier projection  
    37.942     38.617   39.292    39.966     40.641 41.316     
                    
26.39% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.12% 
 
 
 
 
 
23.85% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22.59% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.32% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20.05% 
 
F 
L 
A 
T 
 
T 
A 
X 
 
P 
R 
O 
P 
O 
S 
A 
L 
S 
Lower basic (primary) 
goods but higher (non-
primary) public goods  
u(ξ2) = 29.45 
g(ξ2) = 1.29 
u(ξ1) = 4.54 
g(ξ1) = 10.9 
ξ2 = 39.16 
ξ1 = 5.32 
Lower public (non-primary) 
goods but higher basic  
(primary) goods 
W(λ) = 38.75 
VITAL  PUBLIC  GOODS  PER  CAPITA 
AVERAGE TAXABLE INCOME, THE WEALTH  PER CAPITA 
λ = 17.36 
(45)
Mathematical derivation
(1) .τ W( )ξ B( )ξ g Delivery constraint: the tax returns = welfare pie = sum of  
primary (subsidies) and non-primary (public) goods     g
(2) B( )ξ ..x τ W( )ξ Balance of subsidies with the slice x of welfare pie
(3) u .( )1 τ ( )ξ φ φ Stability constraint to remove the welfare hazard effect
Cost of living, social minimum or basic goods: 
Poverty line income      ξ        minus tax sacrificeu ξ .τ ( )ξ φ .τ ( )ξ φ
Replacing τ
B( )ξ g
W( )ξ from  (1)  into u ξ
.τ ( )ξ φ leads to u ξ .B( )ξ g
W( )ξ ( )ξ φ
(31) Doing differently, replacing τ B( )ξ.x W( )ξ from  (2)  into  (3)  we get (c.f., at p. 17)
(4) L( ),,ξ x u .( )ξ φ B( )ξ ..x ( )ξ u W( )ξ 0 called volatility constraint, which 
amalgamates  (2)  and  (3),  p.22
(6) D( ),,ξ x u d
dξ
L( ),,ξ x u d
dξ
( ).( )ξ φ B( )ξ ..x ( )ξ u W( )ξ 0 Bargaining frontier  
constraint
(61) d
dξ
( ).( )ξ φ B( )ξ ..x ( )ξ u W( )ξ
B( )ξ .( )ξ φ d
dξ
B( )ξ .x W( )ξ ..x ( )ξ u d
dξ
W( )ξ 0
F( )ξ d
dξ
B( )ξ E( )ξ d
dξ
W( )ξ Now, renaming derivatives F=B', E=W'  at  p.22  in  (61) 
yields at last to B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ .x W( )ξ ..x ( )ξ u E( )ξ 0
(46)
(62) D( ),,ξ x u B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ .x ( )W( )ξ .( )ξ u E( )ξ 0
Extracting then x from  (4)  we substitute variable x
.( )ξ φ B( )ξ
.( )ξ u W( )ξ into (6
2) 
(63) B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ.( )ξ u W( )ξ ( )W( )ξ
.( )ξ u E( )ξ 0 what results in
(64) ..( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ ( )ξ u W( )ξ
.( )ξ u W( )ξ
.
.( )ξ φ B( )ξ
.( )ξ u W( )ξ ( )W( )ξ
.( )ξ u E( )ξ 0
(65) ..( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ ( )ξ u W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ ( )W( )ξ .( )ξ u E( )ξ 0
A ( )ξ u Collect (65) on subexpression A ( )ξ u
..( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ A W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ ( )W( )ξ .A E( )ξ 0
in the form of (66)  below
(66) .( ).( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ A ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ W( )ξ 0
(67) A
..( )ξ φ B( )ξ W( )ξ
( ).( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ A ( )ξ u
ξ u ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ W( )ξ
( ).( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
(68) u ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ W( )ξ
( ).( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
(47)
Substitute now u ξ .B( )ξ g
W( )ξ ( )ξ φ from  (3
1)  into  (68)  what yields to 
(69) ξ .B( )ξ g
W( )ξ ( )ξ φ ξ
..( )ξ φ B( )ξ W( )ξ
.( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
(610) .B( )ξ g
W( )ξ ( )ξ φ
..B( )ξ W( )ξ ( )ξ φ
.( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
.( )B( )ξ g ( )ξ φ ...B( )ξ W( )ξ W( )ξ ( )ξ φ.( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
(611) B( )ξ g ..B( )ξ W( )ξ W( )ξ.( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
(612) g
..B( )ξ W( )ξ W( )ξ
.( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ B( )ξ C ( )ξ φ
Collect the denominator .( )B( )ξ .( )ξ φ F( )ξ W( )ξ ..( )ξ φ B( )ξ E( )ξ
in  (612)  on subexpression C ( )ξ φ
.( )B( )ξ .C F( )ξ W( )ξ ..C B( )ξ E( )ξ .( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ C .B( )ξ W( )ξ
.B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ Denominator in  (612) 
(48)
(613) g
..B( )ξ W( )ξ W( )ξ
.B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ B( )ξ
(614) B( )ξ .B( )ξ ( ).B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ.B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ
(615) g
..B( )ξ W( )ξ W( )ξ ( ).B( )ξ ( ).B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ
.B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ
Divide (615) by .B( )ξ W( )ξ
(616) g
W( )ξ .B( )ξ .B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ.B( )ξ W( )ξ
.B( )ξ W( )ξ .( )ξ φ ( ).F( )ξ W( )ξ .B( )ξ E( )ξ
.B( )ξ W( )ξ
E( )ξ d
dξ
W( )ξ F( )ξ d
dξ
B( )ξ
(617) v( )ξ 1 .( )ξ φ F( )ξ
B( )ξ
E( )ξ
W( )ξ
(618) g( )ξ W( )ξ
v( )ξ B( )ξ
z( )ξ B( )ξ g( )ξ τ( )ξ z( )ξ
W( )ξ Final definition, p.22
u( )ξ ξ .τ( )ξ ( )ξ φ Defined according to  (31)  as level of 
basic goods (social minimum) at p. 22, 
Observation 1, 
